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There is not a crime, there is not a dodge, there is not a trick, there is
not a swindle, there is not a vice which does not live by secrecy. Get
these things out in the open, describe them, attack them, ridicule them
in the press, and sooner or later public opinion will sweep them away.
Publicity may not be the only thing that is needed, but it is the one
thing without which all other agencies will fail.'
INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the propriety and efficacy of punitive
damages against business wrongdoers. 2 Even those who consider pu-
nitive damages legitimate debate the amount of such awards and the
circumstances in which they should be assessed.3 Whether punitive
damages serve their intended goal of deterring and punishing a trans-
gressor, often a culpable business entity,4 has been extensively argued
in scholarly literature, legislatures and the courts. One result of the
debate has been legislation limiting the amount of recoverable mone-
1. BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRA1THWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE
OFFENDERS 1 (1983) (quoting Joseph Pulitzer) (footnote omitted).
2. Punitive damages are imposed for actions which are offenses against both the individual
and society. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). For an annotated
bibliography of over 100 scholarly articles written about punitive damages, see 2 LINDA L.
SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 22.4 (3d ed. 1995).
3. See infra notes 27-41 and accompanying text (discussing critiques of the deterrent value of
punitive damages and proposals for changing the way in which punitive damages are assessed).
4. Mark Peterson et al., Punitive Damages Empirical Findings, 1988 RAND, THE INST. FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE, 47-49 [hereinafter RAND study] (discussing the percentage of punitive damage
awards assessed against business enterprises); see also Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic
Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1400 (1993) (noting that
the majority of punitive damage awards are for economically motivated wrongdoing).
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tary sanctions. 5 These limits do not replace the threat of potential
large monetary awards with any other sanction.
The narrow conceptualization of options for punishing and deter-
ring socially unacceptable conduct with civil sanctions has unnecessa-
rily limited the debate on punitive damages. Missing from the debate
is an examination of alternatives to purely monetary sanctions. One
alternative is a "publicity penalty" which would recognize the chang-
ing way business is conducted in the 1990s.
We are now in what has been called the "information age." News is
broadcast as it happens, twenty-four hours a day, across the world.
People all over the world communicate instantaneously by computer.
The Internet, a computer communication system known only to a se-
lect few just five years ago, has become a household word. 6
It is against this background that negative publicity, always a threat
to businesses, becomes even more menacing. The rapid spread of in-
formation, coupled with businesses' fears of the impact of widespread
dissemination of their wrongdoings, can be utilized to fashion a pow-
erful civil punitive sanction.
This article proposes a re-examination of punitive damages sanc-
tions in light of current technology. It suggests we move from the
current doctrine of monetary awards 7 to a system which supplements
monetary awards with mandatory publication of the jury's verdict and
the reasons for the verdict. To fully serve today's technologically so-
phisticated public, the article proposes that companies' wrongdoings
should be broadcast over the Internet on a dedicated World Wide
Web page entitled "Punitive Damages Awards" as well as in more
traditional media forums.8
5. See infra text accompanying note 73 (citing resources to a state-by-state breakdown of leg-
islation capping punitive damage awards).
6. Jon Wiener, Free Speech on the Internet, THE NATION, June 13, 1994, at 825. The Internet
Society reported that in 1994, 1.7 million host computers provided gateways for 17 million In-
ternet users. Id.
7. Without some monetary award plaintiffs would have little incentive to prosecute punitive
damages claims. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
(noting monetary punitive damages motivate private individuals to enforce rules of law); see also
Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1451-52 (explaining that a crucial function of punitive dam-
ages is to provide financial incentives for private parties to enforce the law); Michael Rustad, In
Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data,
78 IowA L. REV. 1, 75 (1992) (noting the high cost of detecting corporate wrongdoing and argu-
ing that punitive damages encourage plaintiffs to serve as private attorneys general).
8. "Access to information in our society, like most things, is related to social class." Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1174 n.57 (1995). To enable the information publicized to reach as wide
an audience as possible, it is important that the information be publicized in print and broadcast
media forums as well as on the "information superhighway."
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This article has four parts. Part I highlights the differences between
punitive and compensatory damages. Part II discusses the rationales
underlying punitive damages and the ineffectiveness of the current
system in fully achieving those rationales. Part III reviews the histori-
cal basis of public notification of wrongdoing. Part IV explains why
the proposed publication penalty is an important addition to the pres-
ent system.
I. DISTINGUISHING PUNITIVE AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
Public notification of wrongdoing has a well-established history in
American jurisprudence. 9 However, it never has been formally used
as a sanction in civil punitive damages claims. This first section exam-
ines the difference between compensatory and punitive damages and
suggests that while notification may be unnecessary, and even inap-
propriate, in a compensatory damage claim, it may be particularly
well-suited to claims in which a jury awards punitive damages.
Civil punitive sanctions operate in a middle ground between tradi-
tionally conceived paradigms of criminal and civil law.10 The reasons
for awarding punitive damages are distinct from those for awarding
compensatory damages. Punitive damages are money damages
awarded for the purpose of penalizing a defendant and deterring
others.'" They differ from compensatory damages in that they are not
intended to compensate the plaintiff for any losses.' 2
With an award of compensatory damages, the plaintiff should be
restored to the position she would have been in, but for the injury.1 3
Compensatory damages are associated with specific losses incurred by
the plaintiff' 4 and may be assessed for mere negligence.' 5
9. See infra part III (discussing public notification sanctions in various areas of the law).
10. Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil
Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795 (1992). Professor Mann divides the traditional paradigms of civil and
criminal law into four main categories: (1) the mental element in prohibited acts; (2) the differ-
ent purpose of the two systems (punishment v. compensation); (3) the remedy (stigma and incar-
ceration v. restitution and monetary payments); and (4) the procedures used (higher evidentiary
standards and burdens of proof in criminal actions).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, at 464; DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EouITY-RESTITUTION § 3.9, at 205 (1973); James B. Sales, The
Emergence of Punitive Damages in Product Liability Actions: A Further Assault on the Citadel,
14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 351, 352 (1983).
12. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908(1), at 464.
13. Id.
14. Id. § 903, at 453-54.
15. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164 (5th
ed. 1984).
[Vol. 45:341
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Since punitive damages are intended to punish, they are based upon
the degree of egregiousness of the defendant's conduct. a6 Punitive
damages may be awarded when the defendant acted fraudulently, ma-
liciously, from ill-will or spite,17 or when the defendant's conduct dem-
onstrates a conscious indifference to the rights and safety of others.18
Today, punitive damage awards against businesses mainly occur in
cases involving culpable business misconduct such as manufacturer's
corner-cutting and ruthless business practices aimed at consumers or
competitors. 19
Punitive damages have implications beyond the bounds of a specific
case: "The remedy of punitive damages serves the useful purpose of
expressing society's disapproval of conduct which leads to intolerable
rates of injuries and deaths. ' 20 They punish the wrongdoer, thereby
exacting retribution.2' Finally, their deterrent effect reaches beyond
the specific defendant to others who might consider engaging in simi-
lar misconduct.22
Because punitive damages exist for different reasons than compen-
satory damages, it is appropriate to examine different remedies for
each kind of claim. Money damages are particularly appropriate in
compensatory damage claims since the purpose of these claims is to
make the plaintiff whole. Publication of the underlying wrongdoing,
because of its punitive impact,23 may be inappropriate in compensa-
tory damage claims since the defendant did not act culpably, and thus,
the likelihood that the defendant or others may engage in similar fu-
ture harmful misconduct is minimal. On the other hand, although
monetary sanctions also may be an appropriate means to punish and
deter egregious misconduct, this type of conduct may warrant an addi-
tional sanction-required publication of the reason the damages were
awarded. It is the defendant's culpability and the societal desire to
16. Id. § 2, at 9.
17. Id. at 9-10.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, at 464-65; RICHARD L. BLATT ET AL., PUNMVE
DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACrICE § 3.2 (1991).
19. Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1440.
20. Rustad, supra note 7, at 86.
21. David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39
VILL. L. REV. 363, 375-77 (1994) [hereinafter Owen, Punitive Damages Overview]; see infra part
II.A.2 (discussing the retributive function of punitive damages).
22. Rustad, supra note 7, at 88.
23. See infra notes 201-59 and accompanying text (discussing the punitive impact of
notification).
1996]
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deter future similar misconduct 24 which may warrant this additional
sanction.
II. CURRENTLY CONSTRUCTED PUNITIVE DAMAGES - DOCTRINE
AND APPLICATION
A. Rationales for Punitive Damages
Before examining the proposed publicity penalty, it is helpful to
look at the rationales underlying the current system. Most courts and
commentators divide the rationales for punitive damages into two
principal categories: retribution and deterrence. 25 Yet an analog to
punitive damages, the criminal justice system, provides perhaps a
more comprehensive framework for understanding the role served by
punitive damages.
The criminal system advances four main rationales for punishment:
deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation and incapacitation. 26 Punitive
damages can serve each of these purposes. Whether and how punitive
damages currently address these rationales is discussed in greater de-
tail below.
1. Deterrence
Punitive damages are intended to both specifically and generally de-
ter.27 Deterrence is premised on the theory that a monetary sanction
24. Courts and commentators agree that a primary purpose of punitive damages is deterrence.
See, e.g., Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991); Richard C. Ausness, Retri-
bution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Ky.
L.J. 1, 39 (1985); Sylvia M. Demarest & David E. Jones, Exemplary Damages as an Instrument of
Social Policy: Is Tort Reform in the Public Interest?, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 797, 802 (1987); Dorsey
D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 11
(1982) [hereinafter Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency]; Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1428.
25. See sources cited supra note 24. Additional rationales also exist. They include: preserving
the peace; encouraging plaintiffs to act as private attorneys general; compensating victims for
otherwise uncompensable losses; and paying plaintiffs' attorneys fees. See Ellis, Fairness and
Efficiency, supra note 24, at 11.
26. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5 (1986);
Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1428.
27. Specific deterrence occurs when the punishment is severe enough that the offender does
not want to risk incurring the same punishment again. LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 26, § 1.5, at
31-32; NIGEL WALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER & STIGMA: THE MORALITY OF CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE 65 (1980). General deterrence occurs when other potential offenders, seeing the punish-
ment, wish to avoid a similar fate. LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 26, § 1.5, at 33-34.
Commentators have noted the specific and general deterrent purpose of punitive damages. See,
e.g., Demarest & Jones, supra note 24, at 802-03; Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency, supra note 24, at
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will discourage the wrongdoer and others from engaging in the kind of
misconduct which led to the punitive damage award.28
The deterrence value of monetary punitive sanctions imposed
against businesses is the subject of fierce debate. Many argue that
uncertainty about both the standard imposing liability and the amount
of damages undermines the sanctions' deterrent value.29
In many jurisdictions, a defendant is liable for punitive damages
upon proof that it acted with a conscious indifference to the rights and
safety of others.30 Some scholars argue that this standard is too vague
to provide meaningful guidance to companies wishing to avoid puni-
tive damages liability.31 Others counter that this standard for liability
is sufficiently concrete to yield reliable results. 32 They suggest that
tortfeasors know the type of conduct that will subject them to punitive
damages, either because of a collective sense of morality,33 or because
the conduct is more clearly proscribed than punitive damage oppo-
nents admit.34
Even if one accepts that the proscribed conduct is clear, because
there is uncertain enforcement 35 and uncertainty about the amount of
the penalty, many scholars argue that punitive damages are an eco-
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1); BLATr ET AL, supra note 18, at 8; 1 SCHLUE-
TER & REDDEN, supra note 2. § 2.2(A)(1).
29. See infra notes 31. 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of the uncertainty).
30. See, e.g., Carroll Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Carlton, 892 S.W.2d 496, 501 (Ark. 1995); S&S
Toyota, Inc. v. Kirby, 649 So. 2d 916, 917 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Stuart v. Mills, 899 S.W.2d
156, 168 (Mo. 1995); Gonzales v. Surgi Dev. Corp., 899 P.2d 576, 590 (N.M. 1995).
31. E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively,
40 ALA. L. REV. 1053, 1057-58 (1989); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and
the Jury, 40 ALA. L. REV. 975, 979-80 (1989) [hereinafter Ellis, The Jury]; David G. Owen,
Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U.
Crn. L. REV. 1, 20-28 (1982) [hereinafter Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages].
32. See, e.g., Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Dam-
ages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269 (1993) (arguing that the
conscious indifference standard is viable because, at least in products liability claims, punitive
damage awards rarely occur unless the plaintiff proves that a business knew of a risk of danger
and failed to take available safety steps to avoid that danger).
33. Angela P. Harris, Rereading Punitive Damages; Beyond the Public/Private Distinction, 40
ALA L. REV. 1079, 1110 (1989).
34. Rustad, supra note 7, at 66-73. Professor Rustad, relying on a seminal article by Professor
David G. Owen, notes that in products liability cases, five recurrent types of corporate miscon-
duct result in punitive damages: (1) fraudulent type misconduct; (2) knowing violations of safety
standards; (3) inadequate testing and manufacturing procedures; (4) failures to warn of known
dangers before marketing and (5) post-marketing failure to remedy known dangers Id. (citing
Punitive Damages in Product Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1329-61 (1976) [herein-
after Owen, Products Liability Litigation]).
35. The proportion of tortfeasors who are either not caught or are caught but not found liable,
as compared to those who are caught and found liable, is termed the "enforcement error."
Amelia J. Toy, Comment, Statutory Punitive Damage Caps and the Profit Motive: An Economic
Perspective, 40"EMORY L.J. 303, 306 n.11 (1991).
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nomically inefficient means of deterrence.36 Overly cautious compa-
nies are over-deterred-they are unwilling to engage in socially useful
research and development for fear of unquantifiable liability expo-
sure.37 Risk takers are under-deterred because they see punitive dam-
ages as "a missile in the dark." Given the unpredictability, they are
willing to take a chance that the missile will miss them.38
Some suggest that overdeterrence, if it occurs at all, is far less than
businesses claim. 39 Others contend that uncertainties in enforcement
36. Elliott, supra note 31, at 1062-68; Ellis, The Jury, supra note 31, at 981-88; Malcolm E.
Wheeler, A Proposal for Further Common Law Development of the Use of Punitive Damages in
Modern Product Liability Litigation, 40 ALA. L. REV. 919, 943-46 (1989) [hereinafter Wheeler,
Proposal].
To deal with problems arising from the "enforcement error" and uncertain amounts, many
scholars have developed complex formulas and standards for imposing punitive damages. See,
e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deterrence Measured Reme-
dies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831, 868-88 (1989) [hereinafter Dobbs, Ending Punishment] (arguing that
punitive damages should equal the profit gained from misconduct); Jason S. Johnston, Punitive
Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1402-06 (1987)
(arguing for higher burden of proof and lower standard of care with high penalties for viola-
tions); Wheeler, Proposal, supra, at 928-60 (proposing a calculation of punitive awards based on
the difference between the benefit to the manufacturer from engaging in the misconduct and the
cost of the societal harm); Robert D. Cooter, Comment, Economic Analysis of Punitive Dam-
ages, 56 S. CAL- L. REV. 79, 90 (1982) (reasoning that punishment should equal the illicit benefits
or extraordinary cost that prompts conduct involving intentional fault).
No single formula has received general acceptance. See Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebil-
cock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in Search of a Rationale, 40 ALA L. REV. 741, 813-19 (1989)
(critiquing Cooter's and Johnston's analyses); David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic
Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1990) (critiquing Cooter, Ellis
and Johnston); Jerry J. Phillips, A Comment on Proposals for Determining Amounts of Punitive
Awards, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1117 (1989) (critiquing Wheeler's proposal). The problem of taking
the expected profit from the misconduct, as proposed by a number of these scholars including
Professor Dobbs, involves problems in proof, an issue Professor Dobbs raises himself. Dobbs,
Ending Punishment, supra, at 868-88.
37. Ausness, supra note 24, at 85-86; Ellis, The Jury, supra note 31, at 988; Richard J. Maho-
ney & Stephen E. Littlejohn, Innovation on Triak Punitive Damages Versus New Products, 246
Sci. 1395 (1989) [hereinafter Mahoney & Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial]. Some suggest that
large punitive damage awards cause products to be removed from the marketplace, or modified,
even though some members of society may be willing to accept the risk. See Alex Kozinski, The
Case of Punitive Damages vs. Democracy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1995, at A18 (arguing that the
decision whether to ban an activity altogether or permit it-subject to payment of compensation
to those it hurts-should be made by legislatures, not juries).
38. Elliott, supra note 31, at 1063. But see Michael Wells, Comments on Why Punitive Dam-
ages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1073 (1989) (arguing that
there is no plausible evidence to support Elliott's empirical claim that punitive damages do not
deter corporate misconduct).
39. According to a study by Steven Garber of the RAND institute, research and development
efforts have been stifled only for a few products, including those with limited profit potential,
such as vaccines. Paula Mergenbagen, Product Liability: Who Sues?, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, June
1995, at 48, 48. Garber noted that "[I]iability is unlikely to deter efforts to develop products
believed to have exceptionally large profit potential - so-called 'blockbusters' (e.g., Prozac)."
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and award amounts do not undermine the deterrent effect of the rules.
Instead, they argue that the threat of uncertain punitive damages lia-
bility is one of the few effective means for convincing businesses not
to trade the public good for self-interest.40  Some also note that,
although punitive damages may be an economically imperfect means
of deterrence, sometimes absolute economic efficiency must be sacri-
ficed for the more important goal of eliminating conduct society
deems reprehensible. 41
While the debate on the deterrent value of punitive damages rages
on, scholars also have examined the value of punitive damages in serv-
ing two other goals of the criminal law paradigm: retribution and re-
habilitation. The next sections discuss currently constructed punitive
damages in the context of these goals.
2. Retribution
Punitive damages are intended to serve a retributive function. This
function adopts the view that "the defendant's wrong is such that it is
right in a moral sense, that he be made to suffer, irrespective of
whether this will reform his character, deter his misconduct, or set an
example for others. '42
Theoretically, with a punitive damages award, the injured individual
receives the satisfaction of seeing the defendant suffer, and society
feels vindicated by seeing the court impose a punishment which ex-
presses society's disapproval of serious misconduct and reaffirms soci-
ety's commitment to maintaining moral and legal standards.4 3 For
these reasons, some commentators suggest that to fully achieve the
goal of retribution, the punishment "must be public and must attempt
to shame the wrongdoer."" In this way, society and the wrongdoer
understand the moral gravity of the offense.45
While some scholars argue against awarding punitive damages for
purely retributive purposes, 46 some argue that the retributive function
of punitive damages coincides with their deterrent goals:
40. Rustad, supra note 7, at 5; Wells, supra note 38, at 1075-76.
41. Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1450.
42. Dobbs, Ending Punishment, supra note 36, at 844.
43. Owen, Products Liability Litigation, supra note 34, at 1280-81.
44. Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1444.
45. Id.
46. Many argue retribution is best left to the criminal law arena which provides many more
procedural safeguards than the civil system. See Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Dam-
ages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HAS1INos L.J. 639, 644-47 (1980) (discussing these ar-
guments). However, others argue that exacting retribution through monetary awards is justified
because budget constraints in the public sector have produced the need for private enforcers of
societal norms. Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 36, at 768-98.
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[V]indictive behavior is particularly irrational in that it seeks to in-
flict present suffering to 'remedy' past injuries that cannot be un-
done. Inflicting punishment for past acts, however, tends also to
control future behavior, in that the defendant and others in a similar
position will wish to avoid the unpleasant consequences of such acts
in the future.47
Thus, although retribution is not necessarily an end in itself, the re-
tributive function of punitive damages reinforces their deterrent
impact.
3. Rehabilitation
Another goal of punishment is rehabilitation. Rehabilitation occurs
when the punishment causes the wrongdoer to realize the wrongful-
ness of her conduct, instills in her a sense of social responsibility, and
integrates the wrongdoer into a productive social role.48
Rehabilitation involves reeducation of the wrongdoer regarding so-
ciety's rules and the need to abide by them. Professor Owen explains
that punitive damages educate in two ways.49 First, punitive damages
certify the existence of a particular right belonging to the plaintiff and
a correlative legal duty on the defendant to respect that interest.50
Second, they emphasize the importance the law attaches to the right
and society's condemnation of its violation.51
In many ways, the rehabilitative function is inextricably intertwined
with both the deterrent and retributive functions discussed above.
Ideally, punitive damages, by imposing a sanction for improper behav-
ior, rehabilitate the offender by re-inforcing the wrongfulness of her
conduct and encouraging her to act in a socially responsible way in the
future to avoid further punishment.52
4. Incapacitation
The premise of incapacitation in criminal cases is that the defendant
presents a risk to society and that to protect the public, the defendant
must be removed from situations in which she may cause harm.5 3 Tra-
ditionally, this is done through incarceration.
47. Ma~lor & Roberts, supra note 46, at 648.
48. Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 1980).
49. Owen, Punitive Damages Overview, supra note 21, at 374-75.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.; see also Owen, Products Liability Litigation, supra note 34, at 1281 (arguing that puni-
tive damages serve as a "reformative device").
53. See generally CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS, AND JUSTIFICA-
TIONs (Rudolph J. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds., 1972).
350 [Vol. 45:341
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The need to protect the public is not confined to criminal cases.
Many punitive damages cases involve dangerous products54 or fraudu-
lent business practices. 55 Under the current punitive damages scheme,
there is no safeguard analogous to incarceration to protect the public.
Currently, incapacitation only occurs with punitive damages in the few
cases in which the award forces a company to go out of business.5 6
Thus, incapacitation is not usually discussed in the context of punitive
damages doctrine. That does not mean that it should be ignored.
Although current monetary damages may not incapacitate a wrong-
doer, other punitive sanctions, such as the publicity penalty proposed
herein, may achieve this goal.
B. Empirical Data on Punitive Damages
To fully understand monetary punitive damages in light of their ra-
tionales, it is instructive to examine some empirical data. Given the
primary goals of deterrence and retribution, it is not surprising that
punitive damage awards occur most frequently in cases involving in-
tentional torts and fraudulent or unfair business dealings and least
often in cases involving personal injury,57 since claims involving per-
sonal injury are less likely to involve culpable conduct.
What is more surprising is the amount of the average punitive dam-
age award. Although one might think that a jury's desire to punish
and deter egregious misconduct would result in very large damage
awards, the opposite appears to be true. The median award in the
1980's in Cook County, Illinois was $43,000.58 The median in San
Francisco was $63,000.59 Between 1988 and 1990, the median award
54. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
880 (1982) (involving automobile crashworthiness); Puppe v. AC. and S., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1355
(D.N.D. 1990) (involving asbestos); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987) (in-
volving the Dalkon Shield). For an extensive review of the kind of dangerous products cases
warranting punitive damages, see Rustad, supra note 7, at 65-85.
55. See, e.g., Blue Cross/Blue Shield v. Weiner, 543 So. 2d 794 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), cerL
denied, 494 U.S. 1028 (1990) (involving the fraudulent sale of group health insurance policy and
denial of benefits under the policy); Honeywell, Inc. v. Trend Coin Co., 449 So. 2d 876 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984), rev'd in part, 487 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1986) (involving fraudulent sale of burglar
alarm system).
56. Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1428.
57. RAND study, supra note 4, at 19; see also Stephen Daniels & JoAnn Martin, Myth and
Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MrNN. L. REV. 1, 34-38 (1990) (citing study which shows punitive
damages were awarded least often in personal injury cases).
58. RAND study, supra note 4, at 17.
59. Id.
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ranged from $10,125 in St. Louis County, MO to $275,000 in Los An-
geles, CA.60
Products liability awards were higher than awards in other types of
cases. In non-asbestos products liability claims, the median award be-
tween 1965 and 1990 was $877,000.61 The higher products liability
awards can be explained by noting the relationship of compensatory
to punitive damages. Except in cases involving libel and defamation,
where actual damages may be quite small, punitive damage awards
generally are proportionate to compensatory damages awards.62
Since products liability cases often involve severe personal injuries,
the compensatory damages tend to be -higher than in other cases, and
therefore, the punitive damages are also higher.63
Although punitive damage award amounts in personal injury cases
have generally remained stable over the past twenty years,64 the past
decade has seen an increase in awards over a million dollars.65 Most
cases involving higher awards are those in which the harm is financial,
rather than physical.66 This statistic supports the idea that when juries
find a defendant purposefully acted in a manner which caused finan-
cial harm to an unwitting victim, juries seek to deter and exact retribu-
tion by having the wrongdoer suffer the same fate it intended for its
victim-substantial financial losses. Juries also have awarded multi-
million dollar awards when they have found that a business, out of a
desire for economic gain, continued a course of conduct despite its
knowledge of a strong possibility that the conduct would result in seri-
60. This data is taken from a study sponsored by the American Bar Foundation (ABF) and
reported by Professor Stephen Daniels in: Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony of Stephen Daniels,
FDCH, April 4, 1995, at 56 [hereinafter ABF study].
61. Rustad, supra note 7, at 45. Professor Rustad controlled for asbestos cases, which skewed
his sample, and adjusted the actual median award of $775,000 to 1983 dollars, thus arriving at the
$877,000 median damage award figure.
62. RAND study, supra note 4. at 56-64; BLATr ET AL., supra note 18, at 14; Rustad, supra
note 7, at 50.
63. Rustad, supra note 7, at 50-52, 62-64.
64. RAND study, supra note 4, at 25; Daniels & Martin, supra note 57, at 58; Rustad, supra
note 7, at 18-19.
65. BLAir ET AL., supra note 18, at 11. A preliminary report from an update of the RAND
study indicates that while the number of punitive damage awards is decreasing, the amount of
the awards is increasing. Punitive-Damage Awards Grow in Size, Not Number, WALL ST. J.,
March 8, 1995, at B8.
66. ABF study, supra note 60, at 64; Thomas M. Melsheimer & Steven H. Stodgill, Due Pro-
cess and Punitive Damages: Providing Meaningful Guidance to the Jury, 47 SMU L. REv. 329,
331-32 (1994) (reporting that a study sponsored by Texaco indicates a significant increase in the
amount of punitive damages awarded in business litigation cases); see, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (awarding $10 million in punitive damages for
slander of title); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 774 P.2d 1003 (Nev. 1989) (awarding
$6 million in punitive damages for denial of insurance benefits).
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ous physical harm to consumers. 67 Most of these multi-million dollar
awards, and in fact, most punitive awards, especially in cases involving
personal injury, are reduced after trial, either through settlement or
judicial review.68
C. Punitive Damages and Tort Reform
Empirical data indicates that punitive damages occur most fre-
quently in claims in which they historically have been found proper-
intentional torts and business contract cases involving fraudulent or
unfair dealings.69 Despite this empirical data, to protect businesses
from the impact of punitive damages, especially in personal injury
cases, 70 broad, sweeping reforms in the tort system have included
changes in punitive damages law.71 Reforms have included limits on
damage amounts,72 requirements that a portion of the award be paid
to a state fund,73 and limitations of punitive damages to a single recov-
ery for a single course of conduct.74 Procedural reforms such as
higher evidentiary standards,75 bifurcated trials,76 and judge-deter-
mined punitive damages awards, 77 also have been enacted.
67. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 390-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
(initially awarding $125 million for defective Ford Pinto design); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins, 738 P.2d
1210 (Kan. 1987) (rendering $7.5 million judgment against IUD manufacturer that marketed the
product despite knowledge of the severe health risks it posed).
68. RAND study, supra note 4, at 27-29; Rustad, supra note 7, at 52-58; see also HUMAN
RESOURCES Div., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PROD. LIABILITY: VERDICTS AND CASE RESOLU-
TION IN FIVE STATES 33-47 (1989) (discussing a variety of post-trial activities that may result in a
payment that differs from the award in the initial verdict).
69. RAND study, supra note 4, at 13.
70. See generally id. at 56 (noting that businesses' concerns about the unpredictability of puni-
tive damages awards and excessive awards have led to punitive damages reforms).
71. Rustad, supra note 7, at 6-10 n.22-31. For an overview of state reforms, see Sandra N.
Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, State Punitive Damages Statutes: A Proposed Alternative, 20 J.
LEGIs. 191, 195-97 (1994). See also Martha Middleton, A Changing Landscape, A.B.A. J., Aug.
1995, at 59 (listing major tort reforms enacted in each state since 1986).
72. For a state by state breakdown of state laws on caps and limits, see Janet V. Hallahan,
Social Interests Versus Plaintiffs' Rights: The Constitutional Battle over Statutory Limitations on
Punitive Damages, 26 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 405,451-54 app. B (1995). See also Jimmie 0. Clements,
Jr., Limiting Punitive Damages: A Placebo for America's Ailing Competitiveness, 24 ST. MARY'S
L. J. 197, 205-09 (1992); Toy, supra note 35, at 325.
In 1995, Congress introduced three bills intended to limit punitive damages in products liabil-
ity claims. See H.R. REP. No. 63, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 4 (1995); H.R. REP. No. 64,
104th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 5 (1995); S. REP. No. 69, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1995).
73. For a state by state breakdown of jurisdictions requiring that punitive damages be paid
into a state fund, see Rustad, supra note 7, at 8 n.26; Hallahan, supra note 72, at 451-54 app. B.
74. Rustad, supra note 7, at 9 n.30.
75. Id. at 7 n.24.
76. Id. at 9 n.27.
77. Id. at n.28. For a discussion of the constitutionality of judge versus jury determination of
awards, see Alan H. Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh
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Among the more controversial reforms are those limiting the
amount of punitive damages. 78 Limits on damage amounts, com-
monly called "caps," come in two forms: an absolute dollar amount
limit, or a penalty based on some multiplier of the plaintiff's compen-
satory award.79
Despite the fact that plaintiffs in personal injury cases rarely collect
multi-million dollar awards, 80 those favoring limits on punitive dam-
age awards argue that limits are needed to reduce harm to businesses
in personal injury cases. They assert that "[t]he uncertainty and un-
fairness of the present system discourages employers from investing
capital, making better and more innovative products and creating new
jobs."'81 They maintain that limits are necessary because large awards
in these kind of cases discourage research and development.82 Fur-
ther, they harm businesses' ability to compete in the international
marketplace. 83 Proponents of limits also contend punitive damage
awards harm consumers, since consumers feel the brunt of large
awards because businesses pass on the costs of these awards to the
consumer in the form of higher prices.84
Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142 (1991) (arguing that judicial
determination of punitive damages violates the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial). Cf.
Owen, Products Liability Litigation, supra note 34, at 1320-21 (arguing that the jury should have
the responsibility of determining whether damages should be assessed, but that the trial judge
should determine the measurement of such damages); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional
Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 302 (1983) (considering
the benefits of judicial assessment of punitive damage awards after a jury determination that
such awards are appropriate).
78. See All Things Considered, House Debates Changes in Laws Governing Torts (NPR Radio
Broadcast, Mar. 6, 1995) (noting that punitive damage caps were one of the most bitterly con-
tested items in the 1995 proposed tort reform bill). For a point/counter-point argument on puni-
tive damage caps, see Aubdon M. Pallasch, Brother, Can You Spare $2.9 Million for a Cup of
Coffee?, Cm. LAW., Mar. 1995, at 5.
79. Hallahan, supra note 72, at 414-19; Toy, supra note 35, at 331-34. For a discussion of the
constitutional issues raised by legislatively imposed caps, see Wackenhut Applied Technology
Ctr. v. Sygnetron Protection Sys., 979 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1992); Henderson v. Alabama Power
Co., 627 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1993); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993); Bagley
v. Shortt, 410 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. 1991); Hallahan, supra.
80. RAND study, supra note 4, at 26-30. Rustad, supra note 7, at 57-64;
81. David Masci, Broad Changes Pass House, Face Harder Sell in Senate, CONo. Q. WKLY.
REP., March 11, 1995, at 744, 746 (quoting Rep. Henry Hyde). Rep. Hyde echoed sentiments
expressed by Former Vice-President Dan Quayle years ago. David Margolick, Address by
Quayle on Justice Proposals Irks Bar Association, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al.
82. For a discussion of these arguments, see Mahoney & Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial, supra
note 37; Richard J. Mahoney & Stephen E. Littlejohn, Lawsuits Becoming Liability for Nation,
ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Jan. 3, 1990, at 3C; Richard J. Mahoney, Business Forum: Punitive
Damages; It's Time To Curb the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1988, § 3, at 3.
83. Margolick, supra note 81, at Al.
84. Ted Gest & Clemens P. Work, Sky-High Damage Suits; The Impact on Consumers, Busi-
ness and Professions, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Jan. 27, 1986, at 35; Battle of the Black Hats,
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Opponents of punitive damage limits argue that the limits lead to a
decline in corporate responsibility for consumer safety.85 Commenta-
tors maintain that when punitive damages fail to capture the full eco-
nomic benefit the defendant derived from the wrongful conduct, there
is little economic incentive not to engage in the misconduct.86 If the
total damages recoverable are less than the potential profit, businesses
may engage in the prohibited conduct because it is potentially finan-
cially beneficial.
Opponents of limits further contend that limiting punitive damages
liability allows companies to predict their potential liability and re-
duce their investment in safety accordingly.87 This puts ethical corpo-
rations that actually test products at a competitive disadvantage. 88
Punitive damages limits based on compensatory damages raise an-
other set of problems. A mathematical formula which ties punitive
damages to compensatory damages disregards the punishment and de-
terrence functions.89 In cases with low compensatory damages, such a
formula prevents the trier of fact from considering the misconduct's
potential harm.90 Multiplier limits remove a tool society uses to adjust
the punishment to the wrong.91 Thus, connecting punitive damages
with compensatory damages eviscerates the moral function served by
punitive damages.92
Even without caps and limits, punitive damages as the sole means of
punishing business misconduct are problematic.93 Empirical evidence
indicates that the current system may not change business misconduct.
For example, even after successful punitive damages lawsuits, eight-
een percent of the businesses found liable for punitive damages in
CAL. J., June 1, 1995; see also Ausness, supra note 24, at 16 (noting Ford's argument in the Pinto
case that punitive damages imposed by jury would be passed on to the consumer through higher
prices for goods). For additional arguments about the negative impact product liability claims
have on businesses, see generally E. Patrick McGuire, The Impact of Product Liability, Confer-
ence Board Research Report No. 908 (1988).
85. See Clements, supra note 72, at 212-21; Hurd & Zollers, supra note 71, at 199-200.
86. See Clements, supra note 72, at 212-21; Hurd & Zollers, supra note 71, at 199-200.
87. For a discussion of this argument, see Clements, supra note 72, at 217-18. See also Hurd &
Zollers, supra note 71, at 200 (suggesting that caps may incite the rational actor to undertake a
scheme or fraud that would net substantially more than the amount of the cap). But see Halla-
han, supra note 72, at 443-44 nn.212-13 (noting most states allow judges to override caps when
the defendant's actions are malicious or intentional).
88. Clements, supra note 72, at 213-221; Hurd & Zollers, supra note 71, at 199-206.
89. Hurd & Zollers, supra note 71, at 200.
90. Id.; Melsheimer & Stodgill, supra note 66, at 347-49,
91. Demarest & Jones, supra note 24, at 825.
92. For scholars supporting this view, see Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1447-50.
93. See supra part II.D (discussing the problems with currently constructed punitive
damages).
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products liability cases continued the conduct leading to the punitive
damages award.94
With caps and limits, punitive damages' efficacy in deterring busi-
ness misconduct may be further diminished.95 Thus, in today's soci-
ety, especially given current tort reforms, it is questionable whether
monetary punitive damages alone are an accurate and effective means
of stopping and punishing business conduct that society deems
reprehensible.
D. Why the Current System of Punitive Damages Is Less
Efficacious than It Could Be
The effectiveness of monetary sanctions against a business is limited
for two reasons: (1) the business' ability to avoid the financial detri-
ment the penalty was intended to impose; and (2) the lack of public
information about the reason for the punitive damages award.
Many businesses can avoid the financial penalty, either through in-
surance coverage,96 through their ability to pass the sanction on to
consumers through higher prices,97 or because the award is too low to
have a significant financial impact. If a business can avoid suffering a
financial detriment, none of the rationales of punitive damages are
satisfied. Businesses are not deterred because the financial incentive
underlying deterrence does not exist. Retribution does not occur for
at least two reasons. First, the business suffers no public defeat.98
Second, if society views the punitive damages award as more of a
sanction on society, in the form of higher insurance rates99 or higher
94. Rustad, supra note 7, at 78; see also infra note 214 (discussing manufacturer's refusal to
change warning label even after multi-million dollar punitive damages award).
95. Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1452; Rustad & Koenig, supra note 32, at 1316.
96. Thirty-three states allow insurance coverage of punitive damage awards in vicarious liabil-
ity cases, and twenty-four states allow coverage in cases of direct liability. BLATr ET AL., supra
note 18, Supp. at 21. The trend is to increasingly allow insurance coverage of punitive damages,
especially in cases of vicarious liability. Id. Supp. at 23.
For a discussion of the policy considerations regarding insurance coverage of punitive dam-
ages, see BLATr ET AL., supra, at 73-85; Grace M. Giesel, The Knowledge of Insurers and the
Posture of the Parties in the Determination of the Insurability of Punitive Damages, 39 U. KAN. L.
REV. 355, 390-407 (1991); S. Loyd Neal, Punitive Damages: Suggested Reform for an Insurance
Problem, 18 ST. MARY'S L. J. 1019, 1025-31 (1987); George L. Priest, Insurability and Punitive
Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1011-19 (1989); Gregory J. Sexto, Note, Corporate Insurability
of Punitive Damages Arising from Employee Acts, 11 J. CoRp. L. 99 (1985).
97. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing businesses' ability to pass along puni-
tive damages to consumers).
98. See Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1432-35 (arguing that the retribution function of
punishment is served when the punishment is seen as a defeat of the wrongdoer).
99. See BLAr ET AL., supra note 18, at 75 (noting that insurance companies recapture puni-
tive damage payouts through increased premiums affecting both businesses and individuals);
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prices, society fails to feel vindicated. If a business can avoid the im-
pact of the punishment, the rehabilitative function of punitive dam-
ages is not met either. A tortfeasor who is unaffected by the
punishment has no reason to re-examine and reform its conduct. Fi-
nally, with monetary awards, incapacitation rarely occurs.100
Even if a business must absorb the brunt of the monetary damage
award, another reason monetary awards fail to fully achieve the ratio-
nales for punitive damages is that the facts underlying a punitive dam-
ages award often do not become part of the public domain. Today,
whether punitive damage awards become public knowledge is based,
in large part, on whether the media chooses to publicize an award.
This generally only happens when the awards are very large. 101
Even when the media chooses to cover an award, it may leave out
the reasons punitive damages were awarded. For example, the At-
lanta Journal and Constitution printed a brief story on a $90 million
award ($30 million in compensatory damages and $60 million in puni-
tive damages) against Suzuki for injuries incurred when a Suzuki Sam-
urai rolled over. 10 2 The story failed to explain the evidence which led
to the award.'0 3
The current failure to publicize the conduct leading to punitive
damages awards hampers the awards' ability to deter. Before the
awards can deter, people need to know about the awards and under-
stand the reasons for the awards. 10 4 The lack of information also
means that the awards fail to fully achieve the retributive rationale.
Public condemnation and its attendant sense of shame are integral to
the concept of exacting retribution. 0 5 A society which does not know
of the conduct cannot condemn it. Finally, without full information
about the misconduct, the public's ability to protect itself, and thereby
Rustad, supra note 7, at 37 n.189 (explaining how insurance companies encourage the view that
large jury awards mean an increase in premiums for all consumers).
100. Incapacitation only occurs in the unusual case in which an award bankrupts a company.
Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1428. Even then, some argue that bankruptcy is merely a
ploy which benefits the business by allowing a corporate reorganization while avoiding payment
of legitimate liability claims. See Rustad, supra note 7, at 44 n.216 (citing the bankruptcies of
A.H. Robins and Celotex in support of this argument).
101. For examples of news stories about large awards, see Martin Griffith, Dow Fined $10
Million in Breast Implant Suit, AusTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Oct. 31, 1995, at 45 (reporting the large
punitive damages award against Dow Chemical Co. for its leaky silicon breast implants);
Deborah Sue Yaeger, $13 Million Awarded in Rape Slaying, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1975, at Al,
A4 (discussing an $11 million punitive damages award against a corporation whose employee
raped and murdered a woman while removing furniture from her apartment).
102. Rollover Victim Awarded $90 Million, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., July 8, 1995, at 8A.
103. Id.
104. See infra part IV.B.1 (explaining why this knowledge promotes deterrence).
105. Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1444.
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incapacitate the wrongdoer from causing further public harm, is se-
verely diminished.
III. PUBLIC NOTIFICATION IN OTHER AREAS OF THE LAW
A. Goals of Existing Public Notification Sanctions
Notifying the public of a defendant's wrongdoing or of products
which may cause harm is not a novel idea. Public notification cur-
rently exists in both the civil and criminal law. The goals of these
sanctions mirror the rationales for criminal punishment. Public notifi-
cation is used as an educational and remedial tool.10 6 It also furthers
the deterrent goal of punishment, 107 and may further the offender's
rehabilitation. 08 Finally, notification sanctions also are intended to
protect the public. 0 9
B. Current Application of Notification Sanctions
1. Civil Law Notification Sanctions
a. Administrative actions
Public notification of dangerous products or business practices fre-
quently occurs as a result of administrative actions. For example, if
106. Andrew Cowan, Scarlet Letters for Corporations? Punishment by Publicity Under the
New Sentencing Guidelines, 65 S. CAL L. REV. 2387, 2396 (1992).
107. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D) (1983) (discussing goals of
criminal organizational notification sanctions); see also Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 876 F.
Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1995) (discussing deterrent function of sex offender notification laws); United
States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (reasoning that requiring bakery
defendant convicted of price-fixing to make monthly donations of baked goods for one year
serves to remind executives and workers of violations and to guard against similar future viola-
tions); Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that publicizing
DUI conviction may discourage repetition of the act); Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E.2d 793 (Ga.
App. 1993) (noting deterrence value of requiring DUI convict to wear florescent pink bracelet
imprinted with the words "DUI Convict").
108. Ballenger, 436 S.E.2d at 794-95 (noting that requiring DUI convict to wear florescent
pink bracelet serves as a reminder to the defendant of the consequences of driving while intoxi-
cated, and thus hopefully has a rehabilitative effect).
109. See infra notes 252-56 and accompanying text (discussing how notification alerts the pub-
lic to wrongdoing, thus allowing the public to protect itself from future harm); see also Ballenger,
436 S.E.2d at 795 (noting that forcing a DUI convict to wear a florescent pink bracelet may
protect society in the event that someone notices the bracelet and chooses not to ride with him
or refuses to allow him to drive).
Protection of society also is the justification for the recent sex offender notification statutes.
See, e.g., Tennessee v. Burdin, No. 02C01-9306-CR-00121, 1994 WL 716262 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Dec. 28, 1994). For a review of recent sex offender notification statutes and a discussion of their
constitutional implications, see Michelle Pia Jerusalem, Note, A Framework for Post-Sentence
Sex Offender Legislation: Perspectives on Prevention, Registration and the Public's "Right to
Know", 48 VAND. L. REV. 219 (1995); Jenny A. Montana, Note, An Ineffective Weapon in the
Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse: New Jersey's Megan's Law, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 569 (1995).
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the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) deter-
mines that a motor vehicle defect relating to motor vehicle safety ex-
ists, the manufacturer must notify all registered vehicle owners of the
NHTSA's finding," 0 even if the manufacturer contests the finding."'
For example, in a case in which Ford cars had an alleged defect in the
transmissions causing them to slip out of park and into reverse, a ne-
gotiated settlement resulted in Ford mailing vehicle owners a letter
informing them of the NHTSA's defect determination, along with a
self-sticking warning label to affix to their dashboards." 2 The label
reminded drivers to set the parking brake and turn off the ignition
before leaving the car." 3
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) may insist a
manufacturer notify the public and, in some cases, recall a product
when the product presents a "substantial hazard" or "substantial risk
of injury" to the public." 4 For example, the CPSC required that a
notice of a defect in scuba gear be placed in diving magazines,"15 and
that a notice of a rototiller's danger be advertised in gardening
magazines." 6 A crib manufacturer was required to advertise a stran-
gulation hazard in magazines catering to parents of newborns, to mail
notices of the problem to every United States household known to
have children up to the age of twenty-one months, and to mail warn-
ing posters to all known pediatric clinics and maternity wards in the
country." 7
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) may require compa-
nies violating the National Labor Relations Act to post a notice that
identifies the labor violations and that also expresses a commitment to
incur no future violations." 8 In some cases, the NLRB requires em-
ployers to read the notice to a gathering of its employees." 9
110. 15 U.S.C. § 30119 (1994). For a comprehensive discussion of this statute and cases in
which it has been applied, see Teresa M. Schwartz & Robert Adler, Product Recalls, a Remedy in
Need of Repair, 34 CASE W. RES. 401, 419 (1984).
111. 49 C.F.R. § 577.6 (1994). The notification must contain a clear description of the basis
for NHTSA's determination, and must state measures the vehicle owner should take to avoid the
hazard created by the defect. Id. § 577.6(5)-(7).
112. Schwartz & Adler, supra note 110, at 419.
113. Id.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 2064 (1994).
115. Schwartz & Adler, supra note 110, at 443 n.293.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 443.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988). For a discussion of this administrative remedy, see John W.
Teeter, Jr., Fair Notice: Assuring Victims of Unfair Labor Practices that Their Rights Will Be
Respected, 63 UMKC L. REV. 1 (1994).
119. See Teeter, supra note 118, at 23 (detailing cases in which the NLRB ordered the notice
read, as well as posted).
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The Federal Trade Commission imposes public notification sanc-
tions when necessary to notify the public of existing dangers or mis-
conceptions created by deceptive advertising. 120 Other agencies with
power to order public notification include the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency and the Securities and Exchange Commission. 12'
b. Non-administrative civil law cases
Civil public notification sanctions occur in non-administrative
agency contexts as well. For example, in Lorain Journal Co. v. United
States,122 the United States Supreme Court affirmed a decision in
which the trial court had required a newspaper publisher in violation
of the Sherman Antitrust Act to publicize, for twenty-five weeks, the
terms of an injunction restraining it from further anti-competitive con-
duct.123 A recent Georgia case gave the defendant the option of pay-
ing a $115 million fine for discovery abuses or paying $14 million and
buying newspaper advertisements in which it admitted it wrongly
withheld documents during discovery. 124
Other examples of civil courts ordering notification can be found in
cases involving violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). It is not
unusual for a court to order public notification of non-discriminatory
policies as a remedy for past FHA violations. 125
2. Criminal Law Notification Sanctions
a. Historical roots of public notification
Civil notification sanctions are a relatively recent phenomena.
However, public notification of criminal wrongdoing can be traced at
120. See Warner Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that FTC could
require corrective advertisements regarding Listerine's ability to fight colds and sore throats).
For additional FTC corrective orders, see Cowan, supra note 106, at 2397.
121. Cowan, supra note 106, at 2397; see also Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities
Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. REG. 149, 288 (1990)
(noting that the SEC "perceives publicity as an important component of the deterrent effect of
its enforcement program..
122. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
123. Id. at 158.
124. Emily Heller & Judy Bailey, DuPont, A&B Slam Fraud Sanction, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REP., Aug. 23, 1995, at 1, 6, 7.
125. See, e.g., United States v. Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926
(1982); see also United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd in
relevant part, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975).
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least as far back as colonial America.126 At that time, common forms
of punishment included stocks and pillories.127
People convicted of a crime could be compelled to be placed in
stocks in the center of town or to stand in the pillory wearing a sign
listing their crimes.128 Sometimes, punishment involved daily wearing
of signs or letters signifying the offense. 129 In some cases, the punish-
ment was even more literal. For example, a baker convicted of selling
short loaves of bread was sentenced to wear a loaf of bread around his
neck and a fishmonger selling bad fish to wear smelly fish on his
collar.' 30
b. Public notification under corporate criminal sentencing
guidelines
As the country developed, imprisonment replaced public notifica-
tion sanctions.' 31 Recently, in the search for alternatives to imprison-
ment, notification sanctions have re-emerged in criminal cases.
Corporate criminal sentencing is one area in which public notification
sanctions have received official endorsement. The United States Sen-
tencing Guidelines explicitly authorize the use of public notification of
organizational 132 wrongdoing in two situations: (1) as a term of sen-
tencing when the notification is necessary to alert victims to potential
civil remedies 33 and (2) as a condition of probation in corporate crim-
inal sentencing.' 34 Although classified as a condition of probation in
the second instance, the publicity sanction actually is considered a pu-
nitive option designed to increase corporate deterrence by "playing
upon managerial concerns about firm reputations." 35 One example
126. Rosalind K. Kelley, Comment, Sentenced to Wear the Scarlet Letter: Judicial Innovations
in Sentencing - Are They Constitutional?, 93 DICK. L. REV. 759, 763 (1989).
127. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880,
1913-14 (1991).
128. Id. at 113.
129. Id. Nathaniel Hawthorne's fictional work, THE SCARLET LETTER, best exemplifies this
early form of punishment.
130. Jon A. Brilliant, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of Modern Proba-
tion Conditions, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1357, 1361 n.28 (citing GEORGE IVES, A HISTORY OF PENAL
METHODS (1914)).
131. Kelley, supra note 126, at 763.
132. Organization means "a person other than an individual" which "includes corporations,
partnerships, associations, joint-stock companies, unions, trusts, pension funds, unincorporated
organizations, governments and political subdivisions thereof, and non-profit organizations."
United States Sentencing Comm'n, Guidelines Manual § 8A1.1 cmt. n.1 (Nov. 1994) [hereinafter
Guidelines].
133. Id. § 5F1.4.
134. Id. § 8D1.4(a).
135. Richard S. Gruner, Beyond Fines: Innovative Corporate Sentences Under Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 261, 322 (1993) (citing William W. Wilkins, Jr., Sentencing
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of the formal use of publicity as a corporate criminal penalty can be
found in a plea agreement involving violation of the Clean Air Act.
Using section 8D1.4a of the Sentencing Guidelines, prosecutors nego-
tiated a plea in which the defendant, charged with unlawful emissions,
agreed to pay for advertisements in mass circulation newspapers and
trade journals which explained its wrongdoing, conviction, the punish-
ment imposed and steps taken to prevent a re-occurrence. 136
c. Notification sanctions in non-guidelines criminal cases
Public notification sanctions are not confined to cases coming under
the corporate criminal sentencing guidelines. Judges across the coun-
try have employed publication sanctions as a condition of probation in
a wide variety of non-guideline criminal cases. For example, in drunk
driving cases, courts have required defendants convicted of drunk
driving to place ads in the local newspapers, 137 to place bumper stick-
ers on their cars, 38 and to wear florescent pink bracelets with the
words "DUI Convict" imprinted on them. 39 A convicted sex of-
fender was required to post a sign on his residence and car door stat-
ing: "Dangerous sex offender."' 40
Courts also have required police officers making perjurious state-
ments to issue a public apology.' 41 In Ohio, some courts require first-
time offenders to write a "confessional letter" to the local newspa-
pers.142 In Tennessee, a defendant convicted of helping someone sell
a stolen vehicle was required to confess his crime before a church con-
gregation.143 A corporation convicted of price-fixing was required to
Guidelines for Organizational Defendants, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 118, 119 (1990)). But see
John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the
Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386,452-55 (arguing publicity sanctions are
not the most effective form of corporate sanctioning).
136. Guilty Plea Agreement, United States v. Norwood Indus. (E.D. Pa. filed Mar. 1, 1994)
(No. 94-34).
137. Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
138. Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); People v. Letterlough, 613
N.Y.S.2d 687 (1994).
139. Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E.2d 793, 794 (Ga. App. 1993).
140. State v. Batemen, 771 P.2d 314, 316 (Or. App. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 777 P.2d 410
(Or. 1989). The court never addressed the defendant's arguments that the sign requirement was
an invalid condition of probation, in that it constituted "cruel and unusual punishment," because
prior to his appeal, the defendant's probation was revoked.
141. United States v. Clark, 918 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1990).
142. Massaro, supra note 127, at 1888.
143. Id.
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make a dozen speeches to civil groups about the evils of price
fixing. 1 "
Judges are not the only ones imposing notification sanctions. Com-
munities across the country also use publication of wrongdoing as a
means to discourage socially unacceptable conduct. In some states,
cable TV is used to publicize the names of those arrested for soliciting
sex or attempting to buy drugs. 145 In La Mesa, California, pictures of
men visiting prostitutes are publicized in local papers.' 46 In Ala-
bama's Holman Prison, hot pink uniforms are issued to inmates who
expose themselves to female guards. 147 Finally, in small towns across
the country, the names of those who fail to pay their property taxes
are published in the town newspaper.' 48
C. Problems with Existing Notification Sanctions
Existing public notification sanctions provide one means to alert the
public to dangers and to punish and deter wrongdoers. However, for
numerous reasons, existing sanctions fail to encompass all wrongdoing
of which the public should be made aware. First, lack of resources
severely limit regulatory agencies' ability to discover and prosecute all
business conduct harmful to the public.149 Regulatory agencies rely,
in large part, on the industries they police to provide information
about product hazards.150 Thus, the initial problem in relying on ad-
ministrative agencies as the only means of notifying the public about
dangerous products is that, in many instances, the agency itself does
not discover the problem.
144. See United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 912 (8th Cir. 1982) (describing
publicity sanctions used by other criminal courts).
Not all judges endorse public notification sanctions. See, e.g., Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d
1355, 1401 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that forcing company president to
read notice of labor violations is so humiliating that it is "incompatible with the democratic
principles of the dignity of man") (citation omitted); Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 737 S.W. 2d
805, 816 (Tx. Crim. App. 1987) (Teague, J., dissenting) (noting that if trial courts utilized Texas
statute permitting widespread publication of corporate criminal conviction, it would be "the
equivalent of assessing the death penalty for such a corporation").
145. See John Larrabee, Fighting Crime with a Dose of Shame, USA TODAY, June 19, 1995, at
3A.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Ti NORWICH SUN, Norwich, New York; THE STAR HERALD, Presque Isle,
Maine.
149. Galanter and Luban, supra note 4, at 1442-44; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 46, at 649;
Rustad, supra note 7, at 73-75.
150. See Schwartz & Adler, supra note 110, at 410, 431,454 (explaining self-reporting require-
ments of NHTSA, CPSC and FDA).
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Second, even if an agency detects a potential problem, limited re-
sources and political pressures limit the agencies' ability to remedy the
problem. 151 Industries often successfully directly lobby regulatory
agencies as well as Congress and the administration in an attempt to
forestall regulatory action.' 5 2 Third, existing criminal law notification
sanctions also do not fully inform the public of a business' dangerous
or unethical practices. Criminal prosecutorial offices suffer from the
same lack of resources confronting regulatory agencies.' 5 3 Few busi-
nesses are ever prosecuted in cases in which civil punitive damage
claims are awarded, 5 4 in part because many situations covered by
civil punitive damages awards are beyond the reach of the criminal
process. 55 Finally, even when prosecuting businesses, although the
power to order notification exists under corporate criminal sentencing
guidelines, this power is rarely used.156 Because of these limitations,
existing notification sanctions do not encompass all conduct for which
a jury awards punitive damages. Thus, the proposed publicity penalty
should complement, rather than duplicate, existing notification
sanctions.
IV. WHY PUBLIC NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE USED AS A
SUPPLEMENT TO MONETARY PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. An Overview of the Publicity Penalty
Most agree that some form of monetary punitive damages awards is
necessary to achieve the deterrent and punishment purposes of puni-
151. Teresa M. Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions,
41 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1149, 1154-55, 1162 n.207 (1988).
152. Id. at 1149. During the Reagan Administration, if direct lobbying was ineffective, busi-
nessmen were encouraged to go directly to the Office of Management and Budget or the White
House for help in getting regulatory relief. Id. at 1154.
Industry leaders also are the impetus behind recent proposed legislation to cut regulatory
agency funding and to require agencies to engage in a cost/benefit analysis of new and existing
regulations. See David Rogers, GOP Steps Up Efforts to Cut Funding for U.S. Agencies Opposed
by Its Allies, WALL ST. J., July 13, 1995, at A12 (noting that House Republicans are accelerating
their efforts to use spending bills to restrict federal agencies that have angered business and
conservative groups).
153. Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1444; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 46, at 649; Rus-
tad, supra note 7, at 73-75.
154. In products liability cases between 1965 and 1990 in which punitive damages were
awarded, only one defendant was criminally sanctioned for its failure to protect the consuming
public. Rustad, supra note 7, at 30, 73.
155. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 46, at 649.
156. The author found no reported cases in which courts imposed the notification sanctions
permitted by the Sentencing Guidelines. But see Guilty Plea Agreement, United States v. Nor-
wood Indus. (E.D. Pa. filed Mar. 1, 1994) (No. 94-34).
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tive damages, 157 and to encourage plaintiffs to pursue punitive dam-
ages claims.' 58 The amount of monetary awards necessary to achieve
these goals has been hotly debated.159 As a result, many states cur-
rently put limits on monetary awards, and national legislation limiting
awards has been proposed. 60 However, while reducing monetary
awards, state legislatures are not substituting other means to discour-
age the egregious misconduct punitive damages are designed to pun-
ish and deter. As we reduce monetary sanctions, we need to look at
other means to achieve the goals of punitive damages. Thus, this arti-
cle proposes that current monetary punitive damages awards be sup-
plemented by a "publicity penalty" requiring public notification of
the awards and the conduct leading to them. Publication should occur
on the Internet as well as in other media.
The proposed publicity penalty contains three essential elements.
As a threshold issue, it requires that information about the wrong-
doer's misconduct reach the public. Thus, the "information highway"
existing today is critical to the penalty's success. Second, the proposed
penalty operates under the assumption that businesses value their
public images. Finally, concern about public reaction to the wrongdo-
ing, and its consequent impact on the business' public image must in-
fluence a change in the corporate culture. When these three building
blocks are set in place, the publicity penalty may fulfill the underlying
objectives of punitive damages in a way that monetary sanctions alone
cannot.
157. Even those who suggest punitive damage reforms do not call for their outright elimina-
tion. See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 24, at 92-120 (arguing that an acceptable level of deterrence
can be achieved by making various procedural reforms); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages
for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143 (1989) (answering the questions of
"When?" and "How much?" by suggesting that a "gross shortfall" of compensatory damages is
needed to justify a punitive damages award and that a "rule of reciprocal" be used for computing
the award); Ellis, The Jury, supra note 31 (concluding that various procedural changes are
needed to render punitive damages awards fair); Johnston, supra note 36, at 1433-39 (asserting
that the best way to control corporations' "risky activities" is to use a combination of punitive
liability and strict liability); Wheeler, Proposal, supra note 36, at 946-60 (proposing common law
developments which would attempt to channel punitive damages awards to better serve their
retributive and deterrent purposes). But see Elliott, supra note 31 (suggesting abolition of, or
severe restrictions on, punitive damages). For additional proposed changes to the current system
of awarding punitive damages, see supra note 36.
158. Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 36, at 786-89; Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at
1451-53; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 46, at 649-50.
159. See supra notes 78-92 and accompanying text (discussing proposals to legislatively limit
punitive damage awards).
160. See supra note 72 (citing sources which delineate state legislation capping punitive dam-
age awards).
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1. The Internet Makes the Publicity Penalty Viable
Although the proposed penalty involves publication in traditional
media, it also requires publication on the Internet on a dedicated
World Wide Web page entitled "Punitive Damages Awards." In fact,
the continued growth of the Internet makes the publicity penalty par-
ticularly viable. This new method of mass communication provides a
means of distributing information which was not available just a few
years ago.161
One benefit of the Internet is that it is inexpensive. Because so
many punitive damage awards are under $100,000,162 meaningful
public notification through traditional media forums may be cost-pro-
hibitive. The Internet alleviates this problem.
Publication through the Internet also provides a central depository
of information. A consumer considering purchasing a particular prod-
uct, or a business contemplating entering a course of dealing with an-
other business, may quickly discover facts relevant to their decision by
simply accessing the dedicated World Wide Web page. 163
An announcement on the World Wide Web also has advantages
over more traditional means of publication in that the World Wide
Web publication can be long-term. This resolves the problem
presented by limited short term publication in local media markets,
trade journals, or other mediums. A person might not see a short-
term notice either because the person does not receive the medium in
which the notice is publicized, or because the person is not interested
161. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the rapid growth of the Internet).
162. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing empirical data on the amount of
punitive damage awards).
163. For example, a consumer considering buying a particular vehicle can learn about the
vehicle's defects and the manufacturer's failure to correct a defect. See, e.g., Leichtamer v.
American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1981) (affirming an award of punitive damages
for failure to test Jeep's ability to withstand rollovers and advertising the Jeep as safe for all
terrains despite the fact that Jeep rolled easily on downhill slopes). The consumer can then
investigate whether a defect has been corrected.
A consumer considering investing with a particular brokerage company can discover whether
the brokerage company previously engaged in fraudulent conduct, and if so, what occurred. See,
e.g., Jordan v. Clayton Brokerage Co., 975 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1272
(1993) (affirming, on remand from U.S. Supreme Court, an award of punitive damages against a
commodities brokerage firm for fraudulent handling of investor's account). Based on this infor-
mation, the consumer may question the brokerage company about its investment practices and
determine whether the practices which led to the punitive damages award have been reformed.
A company considering entering into a contract with another business may discover whether
that business previously engaged in unfair business practices. See, e.g., MGW, Inc. v. Fredricks
Dev. Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming punitive damages award for
deceptive practices resulting in failure to pay real estate brokerage fee). With this information, it
can take steps to prevent a similar occurrence in its business dealings.
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in the offending company at the time of publication. In contrast, in-
formation on the Internet can be accessible long after the original
publication has ceased. Therefore, the information is available at the
time the public needs it-when it is considering doing business with
the wrongdoer.
The Internet also provides an easy means for people to express
their disapproval through on-line discussions, or to communicate their
thoughts directly to businesses through e-mail. Offending companies
quickly become aware of the public outcry. Often, this can change
the business' behavior.
The Intel pentium processor chip defect aptly illustrates how public
notification, combined with use of the Internet, can change a business'
conduct. What began as a message over the Internet about an Intel
processing chip which inaccurately calculated high level mathematics
equations, quickly blossomed into a multiple-day story which was
broadcast not only in the traditional media, but also hotly debated on
the Internet.164 As word got out, many businesses began to question
the chip's accuracy. 165 Intel, which originally intended to replace the
chip only for those using computers for high level mathematical calcu-
lations, eventually changed its position.166 To maintain its positive
public image, 167 Intel agreed to replace the chip for any customer
upon the customer's request.' 68
One reason the Intel story effected a change in conduct was that the
public, through both the Internet and traditional media forums, be-
164. In October, 1994, a professor discovered discrepancies in high level mathematical re-
search calculations due to an Intel Pentium processor chip. Dr. Thomas R. Nicely. At the Heart
of the Pentium Debate: A Complex Problem, a Simple Solution, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 18, 1994,
at B5. The professor posted a warning on the Internet to others working in his area. T.R. Reid,
Personal Computing: It's a Dangerous Precedence To Make the Pentium Promise, WASH. POST,
Dec. 26, 1994, at F14. The "report spawned an outburst of anti-Intel flame mail on the [Internet]
bulletin boards." Id. Eventually, the popular press picked up the story.
165. Intel became inundated with calls, in part due to the spread of the news about the Pen-
tium flaw to the "information superhighway - the Internet." Intel Plans No Recall of Chips
with "Rare" Flaw, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 7, 1994, at B4. Eventually, public exposure of the prob-
lem forced IBM to halt shipments of computers containing the chips based on a determination
that the chip could have flaws affecting common mathematical calculations as well. Peter H.
Lewis, IBM Halts Sale of Pentium Chip, THE COMM. APPEAL (Memphis), Dec. 13, 1994, at 8A;
see also Leslie Helm, Pentium Chip Flaw Could Leave Intel Liable for Damages, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 1994, at Dl (noting that the chips' defect produced responses from the Food and Drug
Administration, Smith Barney, and individual entrepreneurs, among others).
166. John Markoff, Intel Bows to Pressure, Offers To Replace Faulty Computer Chips, SAN
Dmoo UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 21, 1994, at Al.
167. As publicity increased and consumers learned about the problems, many became angry
when they learned Intel knew about the problem and failed to disclose it. See Helm, supra note
165, at Dl.
168. Id.
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came aware of the problem and Intel's attitude about the problem. It
is this kind of exposure, with a full disclosure of facts, 169 that the pub-
licity penalty is designed to engender. Therefore, the penalty re-
quires not only that the award itself be published, but also that the
reasons underlying the award 170 become part of the notification, in
whatever forum the notification is publicized. 17'
2. Businesses Fear Sanctions Affecting Their Public Image
As the Intel experience illustrates, in addition to the importance of
the "information highway," the effectiveness of the publicity penalty
depends in large part upon the importance a business places on its
public image. Companies spend millions each year building and solid-
ifying their public image, separate and apart from money spent on
specific product advertisements. 172
The climate of opinion, and therefore the projection of the company
as a moral, useful, and likeable member of society, which creates
and sustains it, becomes (as it were) a direct objective of manage-
ment. It does not contradict the purely business objectives as they
are classically understood, but it is not simply subservient or inter-
mediate to those objectives. It exists in its own right as an opera-
tional goal of prime importance. 173
Businesses have strong reason to believe that a positive public im-
age has value in itself. A positive image reflects positively on employ-
ees, especially senior executives, who generally are status-conscious
people.174 When a company suffers from a bad public image, its em-
169. Some argued that the chip defect story got blown out of proportion, resulting in many
unnecessary replacement requests. Reid, supra note 164, at F14. Others argued that Intel could
have avoided the public relations nightmare by disclosing the flaw upon its original discovery.
Nicely, supra note 164, at B5. Then, if users decided the flaw was a threat to their work, Intel
should have offered to supply a replacement chip. Id.
170. Although traditionally, we have not required an explanation of the jury's verdict, this
proposal is not without precedent. Many jurisdictions permit special interrogatories which seek
the factual basis of the jury's verdict. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-249 (1994) (allowing,
pursuant to the judge's discretion, written interrogatories to be submitted to the jury upon writ-
ten request); OHuo R. Civ. PRO. 49(B) (1995) (same); S.C. R. Civ. P. 49(b) (1991) (permitting
interrogatories at the court's discretion); S.D. CODIIED LAWS ANN. § 15-6-49(b) (1995) (same).
171. The content of the publication obviously is case specific. However, it should contain
basic factual information about the case, such as the name of the defendants, a synopsis of rele-
vant facts, the harm the conduct caused, the amount of the award, and most importantly, the
reasons the jury found the conduct warranted punitive damages.
172. FzssE & BRArTHWAITE, supra note 1, at 289-90. Advertisements often promote the com-
pany, rather than a specific product (e.g. "Maytag is dependable," or "You're in good hands with
Allstate").
173. Id. at 248 (quoting Charles Channon, Corporations and the Politics of Perception, 60 AD-
VERMISNG Q. 12, 13 (1981)).
174. Id. at 152, 232, 240; see also Coffee, supra note 135, at 389 n.12 (citing Daniel Nagin &
Alfred Blumstein, The Deterrent Effect of Legal Sanctions on Draft Evasion, 29 STAN. L. REV.
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ployees, particularly senior executives, may feel like they have lost
status in the community.175 Although lower level employees may not
believe that their status in the community is as directly linked to their
company's reputation as higher level management, even lower level
employees get satisfaction from working with what they deem to be a
reputable company. 176 A positive image thus affects employee
morale. 177
A positive image also has other benefits. Credibility within the
community makes it easier for businesses to influence legislators. A
good image may make company lobbyists "be seen as more credible
when they lobby for or against legislation affecting industry.' a78 On
the other hand, a negative image may not only make it difficult to
influence legislators, it may also lead to legislation businesses perceive
as harmful.179
Another reason businesses fear negative publicity is that a negative
public image may have serious financial repercussions. For example,
in the weeks following the Lockerbie disaster in which terrorists
bombed a Pan Am airliner, the public's perception of Pan Am as an
unsafe airline led to a significant drop in the airline's transatlantic
business.' 80 Similarly, the negative publicity surrounding the Exxon
Valdez oil spill caused thousands of enraged consumers to return their
Exxon credit cards.' 81 Thus, while a positive image may bring with it
241 (1977) as support for the proposition that social stigmatization is the primary deterrent for
middle-class white-collar criminals).
175. FissE & 13RArrHWArrE, supra note 1, at 71.
176. Id. at 152-53.
177. For example, a key strategy of Drexel Burham during the two year junk bond crises was
aimed at building employee morale. JACK A. GOTrSCHALK, CRISIS RESPONSE - INSIDE STO-
RIES ON MANAGING IMAGE UNDER SIEGE 8-16 (1993). "When employee morale is up you can
fight back. When it's not up everything stands still. Employees don't work, productivity slides
precipitously, and defections start." Id. at 9. Although some companies believe employee mo-
rale has an impact on the companies' economic performance, many organizations value em-
ployee morale as an end in itself. FIssE & BRArrHwArrE, supra note 1, at 232.
178. Cowan, supra note 106, at 2398.
179. For example, after the Three Mile Island disaster, there was "an immediate congressional
outcry calling for more effective licensing and oversight by the [U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission]" of nuclear power plants. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 177, at 120. Following the Pinto
collisions, a federal bill was introduced requiring corporate managers to disclose life-threatening
defects in any of their companies' products. FISSE & BRArrHwArrE, supra note 1, at 51. After a
General Electric price-fixing scandal became widely publicized, several bills were introduced to
strengthen antitrust laws. Id. at 191. After publicity surrounding an inadequate security case,
and its attendant multi-million dollar punitive damages award, the Texas legislature enacted leg-
islation requiring apartment owners to install more effective security devices. Michael Totty,
Valid Litigation Will Be a Victim of Tort Reform Bills, Critics Say, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1995, at
T1.
180. GOmrsc'HALK, supra note 177, at 259-60.
181. Id. at 133.
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economic benefits that are difficult to quantify, a negative image may
result in direct economic repercussions such as those illustrated above.
Furthermore, studies show that negative publicity about a product's
safety may affect consumer confidence and lead to a decline in sales,
profitability, and stock market values. 182 Studies also suggest that
negative publicity surrounding indictments for fraudulent business
dealings often results in higher costs of obtaining suppliers. 183
Corporations "that perceive that adverse publicity threatens their
good will will go to great length to correct internal deficiencies and
publicize their actions."'184 Because businesses place such high value
on their reputations, their fear of negative publicity is palpable.185 In
fact, opinion surveys suggest "corporations fear the sting of adverse
publicity attacks on their reputations more than they fear the law it-
self."'186 With the advent of such technological advances as the In-
ternet, leading to the rapid spread of information, the impact negative
information can have upon a company's image is greater today than
ever before. These factors-business' focus on image, the ease of
widespread publication, and the public reaction to the notification-
indicate that a publicity penalty may be an effective means to achieve
the underlying rationales of punitive damages.
182. Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate Behav-
ior, 71 B.U. L. REV. 395. 411-12 (1991); see also Gregg Jarrell & Sam Peltzman, The Impact of
Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers, 93 J. POL. ECON. 512 (1985) (finding that the loss of
goodwill resulting from a company's product recall far exceeds the specific cost of recalling the
product).
183. Block, supra note 182, at 412.
184. Donald J. Miester, Jr., Comment, Criminal Liability for Corporations that Kill, 64 TUL. L.
REV. 919, 943 (1990).
Such efforts are illustrated by Chrysler's conduct following a criminal indictment for fraud
based on employee odometer tampering. The indictment charged that Chrysler employees dis-
connected odometers on approximately 60,000 new cars that were then driven by Chrysler exec-
utives. Chrysler Faces $76 Million Fine for Mail Fraud, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1990, at C9.
Following the publicity that the charges received, Chrysler polled 800 people, finding that 69%
were aware of the charge and that more than half regarded it as a serious issue. Id. In response,
Chrysler began a major public relations campaign, including a public apology, in the hope that it
could reduce the negative effect that the odometer tampering charges had on the company's
reputation. James Risem, Iacocca Steps in To Close Chrysler Credibility Gap, L.A. TiMEs, July
13, 1987, § 4, at 1.
185. Many businesses hire newspaper clipping services and are particularly sensitive to compi-
lations of adverse publicity collected by these services. FiSSE & BRArrHwArrE, supra note 1, at
292. To combat negative publicity, many major companies have 'crises management teams' in
place which are trained and ready to respond to negative publicity. See GOMrSCHALK, supra
note 177, at 8, 11, 84, 95 (providing illustrations of public relations strategies implemented in
response to crises generating negative publicity at companies such as Drexel Burnham Lambert,
CBS, and Penzoil).
186. FissE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 1, at 249.
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3. Interplay Between Public Image and Corporate Culture
The final key to the publicity penalty's effectiveness is that the
widespread dissemination of misconduct and resulting threat to a
company's public image must result in a change in the organizational
culture which led to the misconduct. An organization's culture dic-
tates the organization's behavior, both in the way it deals with its em-
ployees,187 and in the way it deals with the public: "Companies
develop their own distinctive personality and ethos which is so in-
grained, so much a part of them, that the corporate identity expresses
itself in their every action. ' 188 Those who do not adapt to the com-
pany culture do not advance and often do not last long at the
company.189
Various studies of corporate criminality show that certain organiza-
tional cultures embrace internal social structures and processes that
encourage unlawful behavior.190 In one study, sixty-four middle-
management employees of various Fortune 500 companies were inter-
viewed.191 These employees indicated that those companies most
likely to engage in unethical or unlawful business practices were those
in which: (1) middle management was under substantial pressure to
show a profit; (2) employee relations were unsatisfactory; and (3) top
management encouraged, condoned, or turned a "blind eye" to the
unethical or unlawful behavior. 92 The employees maintained that top
management's attitudes were primarily responsible for most cultures
in which unethical or illegal practices were likely to occur.193
The pubiicity penalty relies on the concept that internal values af-
fect the way in which an organization deals with the public. If an or-
ganization's culture led to the misconduct subjecting it to punitive
damages, or the misconduct was caused by a deviation from stated
values, it will often take more than monetary sanctions to force the
187. See, e.g., JAMES C. COLLINS & JERRY I. PORRAS, BUILT TO LAST: SUCCESSFUL HABITS
OF VISIONARY COMPANIES 127-31 (1994) (citing the Walt Disney Company as one example of a
firm that instills pride in its employees by constantly emphasizing to them that Disney is "spe-
cial," "different," "unique," and "magical").
188. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liabil-
ity, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095,1123 (1991) (quoting WALLY OuNS, THE CORPORATE PERSONALITY
82 (1978)).
189. See, e.g., COLLINS & PORRAS, supra note 187, at 129-31 (describing the Walt Disney
Company's culture as "cult-like," and noting that non-conformance to the company's "sacred
ideology" was "punishable by immediate and unceremonious termination").
190. Bucy, supra note 188, at 1125-26.
191. Id. at 1126 (citing study reported in MARSHALL BARRON CLINARD, CORPORATE ETmICS
AND CRIME 122 (1983)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
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company to re-examine its values, or the manner in which its values
are communicated to the organization's employees. 194 The publicity
penalty may provide a company with the impetus to re-examine its
values. 195 This impetus would be the threat to the company's public
image.
B. The Publicity Penalty Increases Punitive Damages' Effectiveness
in Achieving Underlying Objectives
This section discusses the publicity penalty's ability to effectuate
each of the four objectives of punitive damages: deterrence, retribu-
tion, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. The criticisms of the penalty's
ability to achieve each objective also is addressed.
1. Deterrence with the Publicity Penalty
The deterrent effect of punishment is heightened if it inflicts dis-
grace and contumely in a dramatic and spectacular manner....
[P]ainful publicity is not relished by corporate tycoons. Public opin-
ion can be sharply focussed on culprits engaged in antisocial anti-
competitive conduct by means of "creative" sentencing. Measures
are effective which have the impact of the "scarlet letter" described
by Nathaniel Hawthorne, or the English equivalent of "wearing pa-
pers" in the vicinity of Westminster Hall like a sandwich man's sign
describing the culprit's transgressions. 96
a. Public notification promotes specific deterrence
Publication of misconduct, especially publication via the Internet
which already reaches millions of people, 97 means that the public and
other businesses will have the means to quickly learn of the miscon-
duct leading to the award. With this information, the public and other
194. See supra part 1I.D (discussing the reasons why monetary sanctions may have an inade-
quate impact on businesses). Most scholars of corporate criminal behavior, although employing
different models and methods of analysis, agree that to reform corporate criminal conduct, one
must examine the internal conditions leading to the misconduct and employ a sanction aimed at
affecting the internal corporate structure. For an overview of the different models of corporate
criminal culpability, see William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J.
647 (1994).
195. Scholars of corporate criminal behavior have spent years researching and debating the
most effective means to reform corporate criminal conduct. See Laufer, supra note 194 (examin-
ing the strengths and limitations of several models of corporate culpability). I do not presume to
suggest adverse publicity, alone, will change corporate culture from one in which unethical prac-
tices are encouraged to one in which they are condemned. However, for the reasons explained
in this section, the increased scrutiny that comes with adverse publicity may have a significant
impact on a business' motivation to examine and change the culture which led to the misconduct
resulting in a punitive damages award.
196. United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 1982).
197. See supra note 6 (discussing the rapid growth of the Internet).
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businesses dealing with the defendant may scrutinize the defendant's
business practices more closely,198 thereby reducing the potential for
repetition of the wrongdoing.
Publication also specifically deters by ensuring that more than the
top executives and the people involved in the litigation become in-
formed. Public notification forces a company to confront and deal
with the misconduct internally as well as externally. It compels the
company to discuss the misconduct, 99 which may lead employees to
consciously avoid the kind of misconduct which can harm the
company.200
b. Public notification promotes general deterrence
The public notification sanction promotes general deterrence be-
cause it educates other potential tortfeasors about the type of conduct
juries find reprehensible. Armed with this knowledge, businesses may
tailor their conduct to avoid imposition of this sanction.
One explanation for the prevalence of business misconduct is that
companies faced with high costs and uncertainty in devising strategies
imitate the observed behavior of other similarly situated compa-
nies.201 When an industry commonly adheres to a particular custom
or practice, corporate managers may incorrectly conclude that the
practice is socially acceptable. 202 Alternatively, managers may esti-
mate that the consequences for engaging in the practice will not be
serious even when they know a particular practice is unacceptable. 20 3
The notification sanction may disabuse managers of this idea.
198. Gruner, supra note 135, at 298 (noting that with greater information about a firm's offen-
sive conduct, potential consumers of a firm's products or services "can adjust their subsequent
dealings with a convicted firm to better detect and prevent corporate crimes").
199. For example, the publicity surrounding the indictment of many of its employees during
the junk bond crises forced Drexel Burnham to update and educate its employees about the
allegations and government investigations. Go'rsCHALK, supra note 177, at 11-12. Many of the
companies studied by Fisse and Braithwaite not only addressed the misconduct, but also insti-
tuted reforms requiring more communication between lower level management and top execu-
tives. FissE & BRAITHWArrE, supra note 1, at 234.
200. See infra part IV.B.l.c.iii (discussing the deterrence impact of the publicity penalty on
middle management). But see Coffee, supra note 135, at 394-400 (discussing why mid and lower
level employees may not be responsive to penalties assessed against the corporation even in the
face of top management directives to change behavior). Professor Coffee argues that publicity
sanctions best deter if they expose the misconduct of the employee as well as the corporation.
See Coffee, supra, at 407-11.
201. Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U.
L. REv. 315, 329-30 (1991).
202. Id. at 329.
203. Id.
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With the proposed publicity sanction, the details concerning a com-
pany's misconduct and the resulting punishment would be communi-
cated. It would be publicized that, even though it may be industry
custom to wait for federal government money before fixing a danger-
ous railroad crossing,2° or to fail to use flame retardant on children's
pajamas,205 or to discharge suicidal mental health patients when their
insurance limits are reached,2°6 such choices may be severely penal-
ized. Businesses would learn that even if certain practices are com-
mon in an industry, these practices are socially reprehensible and can
lead to serious consequences.
Another reason why the publicity penalty generally deters is that it
makes information about other punitive damage awards easily avail-
able to businesses. With central publication on a single page on the
Internet, a business can readily review recent punitive damages
awards and discover the kinds of conduct resulting in awards. Armed
with this knowledge, potential tortfeasors may re-assess their own
conduct.
For example, following the highly publicized punitive damages ver-
dict of $7.1 million against the law firm of Baker and McKenzie for
workplace sexual harassment, 20 7 individuals across the country en-
gaged in an on-line discussion about the verdict and the ways in which
a business can avoid liability for workplace sexual harassment.20 8 It is
not unreasonable to assume that the discussion following the verdict
against Baker and McKenzie was generated, at least in part, by the
widespread publicity and the size of the verdict. If caps limiting puni-
204. See Johnson v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., No. C-91-441 (Okla.) (awarding $3 million in
punitive damages for failure to place crossing signal at railroad crossing despite known danger
that crossing presented).
205. See Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
921 (1980) (upholding an award of $1 million in punitive damages despite finding that the com-
pany was following industry custom which did not require using flame retardant on children's
pajamas).
206. See Muse v. Charter Hosp. of Winston-Salem, 452 S.E.2d 589 (N.C. App. 1995), aff'd per
curiam, 464 S.E.2d 44 (N.C. 1995). In Muse, punitive damages totalling $6 million were awarded
against a psychiatric hospital and the corporation which owned the hospital when a prematurely-
released teenager committed suicide. Id. at 593. The patient was still suffering from severe
depression at the time of his discharge. Id. The jury determined that the hospital had a policy of
discharging patients when their insurance ran out, regardless of the patient's psychiatric condi-
tion. Id. at 594-95.
207. For a discussion of the case and the jury's reasons for the award, see Mark V. Boen-
nighausen, $7.2 Million Secretary, AM. LAW., Oct. 1994, at 76.
208. See On-Line Roundtable: Learning from Baker & McKenzie, AM. LAw., Oct. 1994, at 83
(excerpting dialogue from an on-line discussion on LEXIS COUNSEL CONNECT). As a result
of the verdict, many "[f]irms with a sexual harassment policy in place [said] they intend[ed] to
strengthen it or enforce it more rigorously; those without such a policy [said] they intend[ed] to
devise one." Huge Punies, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 26, 1994, at A20.
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tive damages to three times compensatory damages had been in place,
the verdict would have been only $150,000209 and likely would have
received much less publicity. Thus, especially with the advent of puni-
tive damage caps, the notification sanction may play an important role
in deterring business misconduct because it insures publication of the
misconduct, regardless of the size of the verdict. It is through this
publication that a dialogue and examination of conduct can begin.
Fear of the financial consequences of public notification 210 also
plays a significant deterrent role. Potential tortfeasors will be con-
cerned about loss in sales, profits, and stock values that could occur as
a result of public notification. Businesses also may fear that the pub-
licity penalty will alert potential plaintiffs, criminal prosecutorial
staffs, and regulatory agencies to a company's misconduct.21' Concern
that public notification may lead to additional investigations and law-
suits may deter businesses in a way that purely monetary sanctions do
not.
Of course, it is possible that punitive damages awards generate pub-
licity even without the proposed notification sanction.212 However,
because publicity currently occurs sporadically, and usually only in
cases of very large awards, the fear of negative publicity does not play
as big a role in the present system as it would under the proposal
herein.
Finally, threat of publication on the Internet compounds the deter-
rent effect of this sanction. Publication on the Internet would involve
more than a one day news story. Instead, the Internet would provide
a constant form of negative publicity which may have a long term im-
pact on a business' reputation. Concern about this impact may pro-
vide deterrence in cases where a single fine or a briefly-run news story
may not.
209. The jury awarded $50,000 in actual damages for emotional distress. Boennighausen,
supra note 207, at 76.
210. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text (discussing the potential financial impacts
of adverse publicity).
211. See Gruner, supra note 135, at 297 (noting that when convicted corporations must send
notices to potential victims, it not only furthers civil claims against the offender, it also may alert
regulatory or state enforcement agencies to corporate misconduct); Schwartz & Adler, supra
note 110, at 416-17 (asserting that adverse publicity stemming from a company's failure to recall
a defective product can, at times, adversely affect sales and increase the number of products
liability claims).
212. See Rustad, supra note 7, at 77-78 (discussing "public relations nightmares" resulting
from negative publicity surrounding conduct leading to punitive damages awards).
19961
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c. Critiques of the deterrent impact of public notification
The potential criticisms of the deterrent impact of the publicity pen-
alty coincide with criticisms of monetary sanctions. Some may argue
that the proposed penalty fails to overcome either uncertainty in en-
forcement or uncertainty about the financial impact of the sanction.
Opponents may further contend that the public notification sanctions,
like monetary penalties, have a limited effect on middle management.
The following discussion responds to these criticisms.
i. Enforcement is uncertain
Some tortfeasors inevitably will escape detection. However, the no-
tification sanction may lead to greater enforcement, especially in
states which limit monetary awards. One result of caps and limits is
that by reducing the plaintiffs' financial incentive to pursue the claims,
they may result in a decline in plaintiffs' motivation to bring punitive
damages claims.213 Even though their financial return would remain
uncertain, the proposed notification sanction might make plaintiffs
more willing to pursue punitive damages claims for at least two
reasons.
First, many plaintiffs want to see the defendant's misconduct
stopped.214 If a plaintiff believes that publication of misconduct may
force an end to the misconduct or at least warn other potential vic-
tims, the plaintiff may pursue a punitive damages claim even with the
possibility of minimal financial return. Second, plaintiffs often desire
that a wrongdoer's punishment go beyond financial penalties. A
plaintiff may seek the psychological satisfaction of seeing the defend-
ant subject to widespread public scrutiny and watching the defendant
have to deal with the consequences of that scrutiny.215 For these rea-
213. Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1451-54.
214. For example, in General Chem. Corp. v. De La Lastra, 815 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991), modified, 852 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1993), a wrongful death case, a jury found the defendant
grossly negligent in failing to adequately warn users of its chemical solution of the risk of death
the chemical posed. Id. at 753. The jury awarded the decedents' families $44.6 million, including
a punitive damages award of $30 million. Id. at 758. After the verdict, the plaintiffs offered to
reduce the award by $15 million if General Chemical would change its warning label. Janet
Elliott & Diane Burch Beckham, Damages Slashed in Chemical Case; but Justices Uphold $8M in
Punitives, TEX. LAw., Mar. 1, 1993, at 6. The decedents' families were willing to substantially
reduce their monetary return if, in exchange, they could prevent other families from experienc-
ing a similar fate. They believed a more explicit warning label would do this. Telephone inter-
view with Ray Marchan, one of the plaintiffs' attorneys (Nov. 11, 1995). The defendants rejected
the offer because they felt the existing label was proper and gave adequate warning. Telephone
interview with Royal H. Brin, one of the defendant's attorneys (Nov. 11, 1995).
215. See Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1406-07 (providing examples of plaintiffs seeking
punitive damages for vindication and punishment rather than for a financial benefit).
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sons, especially as legislatures limit the amount of recoverable awards,
the publicity penalty may encourage plaintiffs to bring punitive dam-
ages claims in cases they otherwise might not.
ii. The financial impact is uncertain
The criticism that the publicity penalty does not eliminate uncer-
tainty regarding the amount of the sanction has some merit.216 Legis-
latures, concerned that uncertainty in the amount of the sanction
unacceptably overdeters businesses, have enacted statutes limiting the
amount of recoverable monetary sanctions.2 17 The publicity penalty
introduces an element of uncertainty that monetary limits were
designed to eliminate.
It is impossible to predict public reaction to the information publi-
cized. The impact of the publicity may depend upon the specific mis-
conduct, the availability of other sources of the product or service, the
kind of business and its market, and the perceived danger in continu-
ing to deal with the penalized business,218 as well as the defendant's
"spin control. ' 219
Presently, no hard data exists on whether current monetary sanc-
tions fail to deter effectively,220 or whether they significantly
overdeter.22' In fact, such empirical evidence may be impossible to
216. For a discussion of the uncertain financial impact of negative publicity, see FISSE &
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 1, at 310-12; Gruner, supra note 135, at 322-23. Even without the
publicity penalty, some contend that uncertainty about the amount of a punitive damages award
causes a defendant to settle claims it otherwise would have defended. James A. Breslo, Com-
ment, Taking the Punitive Damage Windfall Away from the Plaintiff. An Analysis, 86 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1130, 1164-66 (1992).
217. See supra part II.C (discussing punitive damages and tort reform).
218. See Block, supra note 182, at 412. A study by Karpoff and Lott indicated that different
kinds of criminal fraud had different marketplace effects. Id. For example, consumer fraud re-
sulted in lost future sales. Id. Defrauding a supplier resulted in higher costs for input. Id.
Frauds involving misrepresentation of the firm's financial condition and frauds involving regula-
tory violations had other financial effects. Id.; see also FissE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 1, at
310-12 ("Unlike the fine, no certain penalty is imposed [by a sanction implemented by publicity]
at the time of conviction; sentence is determined later by the capricious jury of public opinion.").
219. See infra part IV.D.1 (discussing counter-publicity issues).
220. A study by Professor Rustad found that in products liability claims, 18% of the defend-
ants found liable failed to take remedial steps even after an adverse verdict. Rustad, supra note
7, at 79. In a study for the Conference Board, Nathan Weber found that one-third of the 232
major United States corporations polled implemented changes in the safety design of their prod-
ucts in response to product liability awards. Elliott, supra note 31, at 1061.
221. The information available regarding the extent of over-deterrence is anecdotal, rather
than scientific. "One of the few areas of agreement among businesses pushing for limits on
lawsuits and consumer groups urging caution is that better statistics are needed." Margaret A.
Jacobs, Reliable Data About Lawsuits Are Very Scarce, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1995, § B, at 1; see
Mahoney & Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial, supra note 37 (claiming that companies' research
and development efforts have been restricted due to the "uncertainties of law"). But see
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gather because business interests seeking to reduce the amount of po-
tential monetary sanctions claim that large awards overdeter,222 while
others claim business interests are exaggerating the amount of
overdeterrence. 223
Without empirical data, the debate on whether uncertain amounts
of sanctions unacceptably affect a business' decisions224 or whether
uncertainty is necessary to prevent a business from engaging in a so-
cially irresponsible cost/benefit analysis225 may be impossible to re-
solve. However, if we accept that some sanction is necessary to deter
conduct society finds unacceptable, then we must look for the sanction
that best achieves the goals underlying the penalty. This article sug-
gests that there are numerous benefits to fully informing the public
about the reasons why a jury awarded punitive damages.22 6 Even
though the effect of the publicity penalty may be uncertain, we may be
willing to accept that uncertainty because of the benefits gained when
the public is fully informed.
iii. The deterrence impact on middle management
Another criticism of the publicity penalty is it may be ineffective in
deterring middle management. Public notification of misconduct may
have little impact on lower level employees. These employees, often
responsible for the misconduct subjecting a company to liability,227
will continue a course of wrongdoing if they believe they will person-
ally benefit, in terms of income, status or security, by committing the
misconduct.228 Deterrence occurs only when employees perceive that
Mergenbagen, supra note 39 (quoting Steven Garber of the RAND Institute who notes that
over-deterrence usually occurs only when the product does not have a huge profit-making
potential).
222. See supra notes 36-37, 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing the over-deterrence
argument).
223. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of empirical data to
support the over-deterrence argument).
224. See supra part II.A.1 (discussing arguments regarding the deterrent value of punitive
damages).
225. A cost benefit analysis is an important part of the business decision-making process.
Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 31, at 22-23. What concerns oppo-
nents of punitive damage limits is that limits will lead businesses to choose unethical or danger-
ous conduct when the financial benefits of that conduct are seen to outweigh the financial
penalty. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text (discussing the different views of oppo-
nents of punitive damage limits).
226. See generally part IV (discussing the potential benefits of a formal publicity sanction).
227. See Coffee, supra note 135, at 397 (noting that the "locus" of corporate criminal activity
is "predominantly at the lower to middle management level").
228. Barry D. Baysinger, Organization Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71
B.U. L. REV. 341, 353 (1991); Coffee, supra note 135, at 398-99.
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the risk of violating a social norm is so high that it outweighs the po-
tential benefits.229
The publicity penalty may change the calculus in this risk/benefit
analysis. Since senior management views the threat of negative pub-
licity as a serious one,230 top level management may readjust internal
incentives so that middle and lower level employees no longer per-
ceive it to be in their best interest to engage in the egregious conduct
which leads to punitive damages awards.231
2. Retribution with the Publicity Penalty
a. Public notification promotes retribution
The public notification sanction satisfies society's need for retribu-
tion. Publicizing a company's wrongdoing and subsequent punish-
ment means society sees that the company has been punished for its
conduct which affronted societal values. Society is told the reasons
why the punishment was imposed.232 Seeing the company subjected
to public shame and stigmatization for its misdeeds satisfies the desire
for retribution.233
Public notification furthers the retributive goal of shaming so that
both the wrongdoer and society understand the moral gravity of the
wrongdoer's offense. 234 Shame occurs when those whose opinions
one values become aware of one's wrongdoing. 235 Publication of the
229. The problem is compounded because the degree of risk people will take "increases dra-
matically when the decision is reached collectively within a small group-exactly the context in
which most business decisions are made." Coffee, supra note 135, at 394-95 (citations omitted).
Professor Coffee further notes that the manager responsible for operational and production
decisions is increasingly divorced by corporate organization from those planning and directing
the corporation's future. Id. at 399-400. He explains that "[tlhis tends both to insulate upper
executives.., and to intensify the pressures on those below by denying them any forum in which
to explain the crises they face." Id.
230. See supra notes 184-186 and accompanying text (discussing corporate executives' concern
about the impact of negative publicity).
231. See FissE & BRArrHWArrE, supra note 1, at 234 (providing examples of institutional
changes occurring after widely publicized criminal prosecutions).
232. Professors Galanter and Luban propose that juries be asked to explain how they arrived
at the amount of a punitive damages award. Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1439-40. They
suggest that an explanation of the award amount will demonstrate that the jury is not acting
from blind vengefulness, but instead has a rational basis for the award. Id. The proposal herein
builds on Professors Galanter and Luban's work and suggests that we require juries to explain
why they felt punitive damages were warranted in the first place. As discussed in this section,
this explanation aids society in achieving the goals underlying punitive damages.
233. See id. at 1431-38 (discussing how a publicly visible defeat of a wrongdoer serves both the
retribution and prevention functions of punishment).
234. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (discussing the societal need for
retribution).
235. Galanter & Luban, supra note 4, at 1444.
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reasons for the business' punishment means that those people impor-
tant to the company-consumers, suppliers, business associates, and
shareholders-would become aware of the morally reprehensible con-
duct and the punishment imposed. This publication of wrongdoing
may shame the business and thus serve a retributive purpose.
[1]t is fanciful to suggest that corporate entities inherently lack the
capacity to be stigmatized because they are fictitious beings, without
friends and neighbors .... The force of loyalty and collective senti-
ment can lead to soul-searching and loss of morale within organiza-
tions just as it can within the family of an individual convict. Were
the position otherwise, one would hardly expect corporations them-
selves to sponsor so large an industry of corporate image-making. 236
With the publicity penalty, a company concerned about its reputa-
tion would not be able to hide its misdeeds. Instead, it may find that
to redeem itself, it needs to acknowledge its wrongdoing, express re-
morse, and explain its intention to remedy the problem leading to the
misconduct.237 This public "mea culpa," although serving a retributive
function, has other benefits. A company forced to go through this
process once is unlikely to want to do it again. Although retribution
occurs, it is not an end in itself. It becomes a means to control future
behavior because the defendant and others will want to avoid the con-
sequences attendant with the wrongdoing. Thus, retribution is no
longer an irrational attempt to inflict present suffering to remedy past
wrongs. Instead, it becomes intertwined with the deterrent function
of punishment. 238
b. Critiques of the retributive impact of public notification
One criticism of the publicity penalty's ability to exact retribution is
that in many cases, publication of the misconduct will fail to shame
the wrongdoer.2 39 The lack of humbling does not, however, eliminate
the retributive effect of the notification sanction. Society may feel
236. FissE & BRA1THWAITE, supra note 1, at 289; cf. Coffee, supra note 135, at 429 (arguing
that stigmatizing a corporation is difficult because the consumer cares about the product, not the
producer). Professor Coffee and other scholars' views about the ability to stigmatize a corpora-
tion are addressed by Professors Fisse and Braithwaite. FiSSE & BRArrwArrE, supra, at 288-90.
237. Miester, supra note 184, at 943; see also supra note 184 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Chrysler's response to widespread publicity of the criminal indictment for odometer
tampering).
238. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 46, at 648.
239. A wrongdoer found liable by the jury often becomes defensive about its actions and feels
maligned by the verdict. FISSE & BRAITHWArrE, supra note 1, at 247. Instead of feeling
ashamed, the wrongdoer feels it has been unjustly punished. Id.; see also Massaro, supra note
127 (arguing that the effectiveness of publicly shaming a wrongdoer depends on various social
and psychological factors, and that in most cases, shaming sanctions do not effectively deter
crime).
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vindicated because it will view the wrongdoer as having been de-
feated, even if the wrongdoer expresses no shame.240
A counter-veiling criticism is that the publication may not reassure
society that the rights of individuals are being protected by the justice
system. In fact, it may have the opposite effect. If awards are limited
by punitive damage caps, the notification about the amount of the
award may actually convey the message that the law does not truly
value the rights of individuals.
For example, consider the following hypothetical case:241 A young
woman suffers from Pelvic Inflammatory Disease, caused by a birth
control device, and undergoes a hysterectomy. She sues the device's
manufacturer claiming it purposefully marketed the device as safe and
effective, even though it knew the device could cause the injuries she
suffered. The jury finds the manufacturer knowingly marketed the de-
vice despite its potential for severely injuring women because it
wanted a larger market share, and thus awards punitive damages.
Assume punitive damages are capped at a specific amount, for exam-
ple $350,000.242 If this occurred, members of the public, reading about
this verdict may feel that the punishment of $350,000 is only a slap on
the wrist when the company makes millions of dollars each year from
the sale of the defective product.
As the above hypothetical case illustrates, instead of satisfying soci-
ety's desire for retribution, publication may reinforce a sense of
powerlessness and disillusionment with the protection provided by the
legal system. The solution to this problem is not to abandon the con-
cept of notification, but to re-examine the concept of award limits.
The notification sanction will not only educate the public about the
types of wrongdoing society condemns, but may also enlighten them
about the effects of tort reform.
240. For example, even after the verdict in the Ford Pinto case, Ford refused to acknowledge
any culpability. FISSE & BRArrHwArrE, supra note 1, at 43-48. In fact, it waged a major battle in
the criminal courts and press in which it denied any wrongdoing. Id. at 41-48. Despite Ford's
efforts, Professors Galanter and Luban argue that the Pinto verdict is an example of a publicly
visible defeat - one in which the public's desire for retribution was satisfied. Galanter &
Luban, supra note 4, at 1436-38.
241. This hypothetical case is based on the Dalkon Shield litigation. See Palmer v. A.H. Rob-
ins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987).
242. See, e.g, VA. CODE AN . § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1987) (capping punitive damage awards at
$350,000).
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3. Rehabilitation with the Publicity Penalty
a. Public notification promotes rehabilitation
The publicity penalty also furthers the rehabilitative purpose of pu-
nitive damages. In attracting public attention to the background and
relevance of corporate violations, publicity sanctions enable society to
engage in moral reflection about corporate offenses instead of keep-
ing them from the public eye.243 This reflection should lead the of-
fender, and other potential offenders, to understand the jury's moral
outrage and reasons for their verdict. In this way, publication and its
resulting impact on corporate prestige may lead to a "collective soul-
searching" and examination of the reasons the conduct occurred in
much the same way that families of individual convicts examine "how
they went wrong."' 2 " This reevaluation furthers the rehabilitative
goal of punishment.
In order to change the conduct, the culture of the organization must
change from one in which the unethical or illegal conduct is condoned
by top management to one in which the conduct is condemned and
procedures are instituted which insure that middle managers do not
receive mixed messages concerning the risks and benefits of manage-
rial misconduct. 245 Companies which have felt the sting of publicity
accompanying their criminal misconduct have engaged in re-evalua-
tion and internal restructuring. 246 In the Fisse and Braithwaite study,
following the onslaught of publicity resulting from numerous compa-
nies' criminal misconduct, those companies instituted various reforms
designed to prevent the misconduct from reoccurring. 247 These re-
forms changed the culture of the corporation from one in which man-
agement turned a blind eye to the misconduct to one in which
management took an active role in preventing the misconduct.248 The
publicity penalty may produce a similar result.
b. Critique of the rehabilitative impact of public notification
Many of the same criticisms of the ability of the publicity penalty to
deter and serve a retributive function can be said about its ability to
243. FissE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 1, at 294.
244. Id. at 289.
245. Coffee, supra note 135, at 398-400; see also Baysinger, supra note 228, at 350-55 (discuss-
ing the relationship between managerial risk-taking and an organization's internal control
system).
246. See FisSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 1, at 233-36 (providing an overview of internal
reforms resulting from widespread publicity of certain companies' wrongdoing).
247. Id.
248. Id.
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rehabilitate. 249 Specifically, some companies may decide to "proceed
as usual" despite the notification sanction. Whether the publication
causes a re-examination of corporate values may depend on the im-
pact, or perceived impact, it has on the organization's decision mak-
ers.25 0 If those with the power to effectuate internal changes perceive
no adverse consequences from the notification sanction, then the pub-
licity penalty may not rehabilitate the offender any more than mone-
tary sanctions would.
4. Incapacitation with the Publicity Penalty
a. Public notification incapacitates a wrongdoer
Finally, the publicity penalty may incapacitate a wrongdoer.251
When the misconduct continues after the jury's verdict, public notifi-
cation of the wrongdoing would allow market forces to dictate
whether the conduct needs to change.252 If the conduct is on-going
and the public is made aware of the potential harm, consumers may
not purchase the product or do business with the tortfeasor.2 53 In this
way, public notification "incapacitates" a wrongdoer.
b. Critique of the incapacitative impact of public notification
i. Need for incapacitation disappears once the misconduct ceases
One argument against using the publicity penalty to incapacitate is
that the need for public notification ends when the misconduct ceases.
However, if the case involves a product which remains in the public
domain, owners of the product should be alerted to the risk so that
249. See supra parts IV.B.I.c, IV.B.2.b (discussing, respectively, the critiques of the deterrent
and retributive effects of the publicity penalty).
250. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text (discussing reasons a business' decision-
maker may fear adverse publicity). But see Coffee, supra note 135, at 455 (arguing that only by
motivating corporations to use internal discipline against wrongdoers, or by prosecuting wrong-
doers directly, can society reach corporate decision-makers).
251. One purpose of the jail sentence is to remove the dangerous individual from society,
thereby protecting the public. No similar method of protecting the public exists when a business
is found civilly liable for egregious misconduct which results in death or serious injury. Not only
does that business continue doing business, but the public often never finds out about the
misconduct.
252. See Block, supra note 182, at 411 (noting the reputational effects of sanctions); Mark A.
Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment. An Update on Sentencing Practice in the Federal
Courts, 1988-1990, 71 B.U. L. REv. 247, 266-67 (1991) (discussing the marketplace penalties
against organizations).
253. See Block, supra note 182, at 412. One concern raised by commentators is that adverse
publicity about one instance of misconduct or one harmful product may mean that consumers
are unwilling to deal with the business altogether. This "spillover" effect thus goes far beyond
the purpose of ending the harmful conduct and results in unacceptable financial repercussions.
For a discussion of this argument and responses to it, see Cowan, supra note 106, at 2403-04.
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they may make an informed choice as to whether to continue using
the product. Because administrative agencies often lack the resources
to provide this notification, 54 the publicity penalty may result in more
widespread notification than currently exists.
Also, since the misconduct warranting punitive damages involves a
degree of culpability not present in compensatory damage cases,2 55
the notification sanction informs the public not only of an existing
danger, if there is one, but also of the company's attitude toward sub-
jecting the public to that danger. It is this attitude, either toward a
known danger or about a company's ruthless business practices, that
is communicated. With knowledge of this attitude, people considering
future dealings with the wrongdoer would have an opportunity to take
precautions against future harm by the wrongdoer.2 56
ii. Information "overload"
Some may argue that the sanction's ability to incapacitate is limited
because the public, already bombarded with information, would pay
little attention to the notification.2 57 Yet, because punitive damages
awards are relatively rare,2 58 the instances of notification would simi-
larly be low. Since these notices are not common place, they may re-
ceive more attention. As commentators note:
Formal publicity sanctions conceivably might reduce the problem of
communication noise. An accurate and authoritative message
transmitted under court order could provide a homing signal rather
than merely another buzz.259
Finally, publication on a World Wide Web page would not "inun-
date" the public. Rather, it would provide a convenient resource that
the public could refer to when seeking information about a particular
business.
254. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (noting the inability of agencies to dis-
cover harmful conduct).
255. See supra part I (distinguishing punitive damages from compensatory damages).
256. See Gruner, supra note 135, at 298 (suggesting that information about past criminal
wrongdoing allows potential consumers to protect themselves when dealing with the
wrongdoer).
257. This argument has been raised in the context of corporate criminal notification sanctions.
See Coffee, supra note 135, at 426; cf. Miester, supra note 184, at 944 (arguing that even oppo-
nents of publicity agree that it may work for corporate homicide and other violations which
threaten health and safety).
258. Punitive damage awards occur in only about 4.5% of all cases tried to a verdict. ABF
study, supra note 60, at 48.
259. FISSE & BRArrHWArrE, supra note 1, at 294.
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C. Other Benefits of the Publicity Penalty
1. Society as Well as the Plaintiff Benefits
Under the proposed publicity penalty, society, not just the plaintiff,
would benefit. Some argue that when a plaintiff receives a punitive
damages award, the plaintiff gets a "windfall," while society, also
harmed by the conduct, receives nothing.260 With the notification
sanction, society, as well as the plaintiff, would benefit because mem-
bers of society would acquire the information necessary to make in-
formed decisions about a business or product and thus would be
better equipped to protect itself against dangerous or unethical busi-
ness practices.
2. Allows Public To Make Informed Decisions About Tort Reform
Many argue that juries act irrationally261 or with an incomplete un-
derstanding of how businesses operate.262 For these reasons, they ar-
gue that punitive damage awards must be limited or even
eliminated.263 The rationale is that the less effective society believes
the legal process is in uncovering and punishing wrongdoing, the more
concerned it should be about the system and the more cautious it
should be in using the system's results to punish.264
The publicity penalty attempts to address this concern. One reason
why society believes that the system is irrational may be that society
does not understand the reasons why a jury makes a particular award.
The classic example is the McDonald's "hot coffee spill" case. In that
case, a seventy-nine-year-old woman purchased a cup of McDonald's
coffee while she was a passenger in her grandson's automobile. 265 Af-
ter her grandson stopped the car, the woman attempted to hold the
coffee securely between her knees and open the lid.266 The cup tipped
over, and scalding coffee poured on her, causing third degree burns
which required an eight-day hospitalization, debridement, and skin
260. For a discussion of these arguments, see Janie L. Shores, A Suggestion for Limited Tort
Reform: Allocation of Punitive Damage Awards To Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA. L. REV. 61, 90
(1992); Lynda A. Sloane, Note, The Split Award Statute: A Move Toward Effectuating the True
Purpose of Punitive Damages, 28 VAL U. L. REV. 473, 474-75 (1993). In response to this argu-
ment, many states now require the plaintiff to give a portion of any punitive damages award to
the state. See infra notes 294-96 and accompanying text.
261. Ausness, supra note 24, at 57; Elliott, supra note 31, at 1064-65.
262. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 31, at 10-12.
263. Elliott, supra note 31, at 1062-68.
264. This rationale is implicit, if not explicit, in the critiques of currently constructed punitive
damages.
265. S. Reed Morgan, McDonald's Burned Itself, LEGAL TiMEs, Sept. 19, 1994, at 26.
266. Id.
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grafting, and caused scarring and a two-year disability.267 The jury
awarded the plaintiff $200,000 in compensatory damages (reduced to
$160,000 because the jury found she was twenty percent at fault) and
$2.7 million in punitive damages. 268 Many pointed to the verdict as an
example of why our tort system so urgently needs reform.269
While the award itself was widely publicized, many stories omitted
the underlying facts.270 For example, McDonald's sells its coffee at
180 to 190 degrees Fahrenheit, and coffee at that temperature, if
spilled, causes third degree burns in two to seven seconds.271 These
serious burns require skin grafting, debridement, and whirlpool treat-
ments costing tens of thousands of dollars, and often result in perma-
nent disfigurement and cause extreme pain.272 McDonald's admitted
that it knew of the risk of serious burns from its scalding hot coffee for
more than ten years before the plaintiff was injured, and in the ten
years before the injury, had received complaints from more than 700
people who had been burned, many in the genital area.273 McDon-
ald's knew about the risk of serious bums from the scalding coffee
and did not warn customers of this risk.274 An additional fact that did
not receive wide-spread publicity was that the award was drastically
reduced post-trial.275
If people had understood the facts underlying the award against
McDonald's, would they still have felt the award was unjustified? It
may be that they would have, or it may be that public opinion would
have been different. What the publicity penalty could do is lead to an
informed discussion about the need for tort reform-a discussion that
cannot occur unless people have all the underlying information about
why a jury is awarding punitive damages. 276
267. Id.
268. Id. The trial judge later reduced the punitive award to $480,000. Id.
269. The American Tort Reform Association ran radio ads highlighting the case as part of its
Tort Reform campaign. Richard B. Schmitt, Truth Is First Casualty of Tort-Reform Debate,
WALL ST. J., March 7, 1995, at B1, 10.
270. See, e.g., McDonalds Cup of Scalding Coffee: $2.9 Million Award, Cm. TRIB., Aug. 18,
1994, at 1 (reporting only the amount of the damages award and the fact that the coffee was
served at an unusually hot temperature); Hot Cup of Coffee Costs $2.9 Million, ORANGE
CouNl-Y REG., Aug. 19, 1994, at C1 (noting only that the coffee spilt was unusually hot, and that
the plaintiff spilt the coffee while trying to remove the cap from the cup).
271. Morgan, supra note 265, at 26.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Schmitt, supra note 269, at 10.
276. See id. at 1, 10 (providing other examples of misinformation concerning punitive damages
awards).
[Vol. 45:341
PAINFUL PUBLICITY
3. Alerts Other Victims to Potential Claims
When a business publicizes its wrongdoing, others harmed by simi-
lar wrongdoing learn of potential civil claims.277 Public notification
aids the potential plaintiffs in pursuing remedies they may not have
known existed. For example, the Senate Committee noted that crimi-
nal organizational notification sanctions278 facilitate private actions
that may be warranted for recovery of losses due to fraud or inten-
tionally deceptive practices. 279 The Senate Committee also noted that
"without such a provision, many victims of major fraud schemes may
not become aware of the fraud ... until it is too late to seek legal
redress, or may not be able to ascertain the perpetrator's current
whereabouts .... "280
Some may argue against the publicity penalty because the potential
for "copycat" litigation can lead to severe financial consequences for
the tortfeasor and others engaged in similar practices. Although the
threat of copycat litigation is a real problem, it is a problem that calls
for balancing competing interests-those of a defendant found liable
for punitive damages for egregious conduct and those of the injured
plaintiff who discovers a potential remedy for a wrongfully inflicted
injury. The purpose of our tort system is to compensate individuals
wrongfully injured.28' Particularly when the conduct is egregious
enough to warrant the imposition of punitive damages, others injured
by similar culpable conduct ought to have the opportunity to seek
compensation. Moreover, the threat of multiple suits also decreases
the incentive to engage in the misconduct. 28 2
In wholly unmeritorious cases, Rule 11 sanctions should deter plain-
tiffs. 28 3 In other questionable cases, defendants may move for sum-
mary judgment.2s4 Although these procedural remedies do not solve
the potential problems caused by unmeritorious copycat litigation,
they do provide some degree of protection for defendants.
277. See Miester, supra note 184, at 944 (citing Fred L. Rush, Jr., Corporate Probation: Inva-
sive Techniques for Restructuring Institutional Behavior, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 33, 89 (1986)).
278. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text (discussing the use of public notification
of organizational wrongdoing in the context of federal sentencing guidelines).
279. S. REP. No. 225, at 83.
280. Id.
281. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (discussing the functions of compensatory
damages).
282. See S. REP. No. 225, at 84.
283. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (allowing the parties to invoke by motion, or the court to invoke
on its own initiative, sanctions for frivolous claims).
284. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (requiring courts to dismiss claims if there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law).
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D. Other Critiques of the Publicity Penalty
1. Counter-publicity dilutes effects
One criticism of the proposed publicity penalty is that the efficacy
of publicity would depend upon whether offenders engage in counter-
publicity campaigns.285 Especially wealthy defendants may spend mil-
lions in "spin control" hoping to stem the tide of adverse public opin-
ion.286 Since the court has no right to reply, the defendant's "spin"
may be the message the public gets.
For numerous reasons, this concern, although valid, does not mean
the publicity penalty should be discounted. First, having to invest sig-
nificant time, energy and money in a concerted public relations effort
is a punishment in itself. Second, although the defendants may be
able to engage in a publicity campaign in traditional media forums,
they cannot alter the facts memorialized on the dedicated World Wide
Web page. A person receiving mixed messages will be able to return
to the World Wide Web page-which may help counter the defend-
ant's public relations campaign. Finally, many businesses faced with
negative publicity choose not to engage in counter-publicity cam-
paigns for fear of "fanning the flames. '287 Thus the threat of counter-
publicity may not be as great as anticipated.
2. Spillover Effect
Another criticism of public notification is that the effect of notifica-
tion may harm stockholders and innocent employees, as well as those
responsible for the misconduct.288 These individuals may be harmed
by loss of profitability accompanying notification and the social stig-
matization that may occur when a company's misdeeds become
public.289
285. Cowan, supra note 106, at 2407; Miester, supra note 184, at 945 (citing Brent Fisse, Re-
constructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1141, 1231 (1983)).
286. See, e.g., GorrsCHALK, supra note 177, at 3-16 (discussing Drexel Bumham Lambert's
response to the junk bond crises); id. at 126-28 (detailing Suzuki's response to a Consumer Re-
ports magazine press conference during which it was announced that the Suzuki Samurai was
"not acceptable" and should be recalled).
287. See FissE & BRArrHWAITE, supra note 1, at 295-98 (discussing the counter-publicity
argument).
288. Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1055 (D.N.J. 1989) (stating that puni-
tive damages which render a company insolvent harm innocent employees and creditors); see
also Coffee, supra note 135, at 429 (commenting that stigmatizing a corporation is dangerous
because of the uncontrollable nature of the penalty).
289. This may be especially true in mass tort cases if the information is rebroadcast following
each jury verdict. Because of the special circumstances of mass tort claims, implementation of
this proposal in those situations may require further exploration. For a discussion of the power-
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The plight of employees and shareholders must be put in perspec-
tive. One must remember that shareholders and employees likely
benefit from the misconduct, because generally the misconduct in-
volves attempts to increase a business' profitability. 290 Furthermore,
shareholders and employees who become aware of the misconduct
and its consequences may be much more likely to take an active role
in remedying the problems that led to the misconduct.291
E. Potential Constitutional Concerns
The proposed publicity penalty raises some constitutional con-
cerns.292 For example, some may argue that requiring a defendant to
pay advertisement costs may increase the total amount of damages
awarded by the jury. This increase could be viewed as analogous to
constitutionally impermissible additur.293 To avoid additur issues aris-
ing in the context of payment of the costs of advertising, the notifica-
tion costs should be paid from the award itself.294
ful effects of multiple punitive damage awards in mass tort cases, see Galanter & Luban, supra
note 4, at 1414-15.
290. Id. at 1440. Stockholders' plight also draws considerably less sympathy than that of low
level employees. See, e.g., Wangen v.'Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437,453 (Wisc. 1980) (noting
that loss of investment is a risk stockholders take); Acosta v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 717 F.2d
828, 839 n.17 (1983) (noting that shareholders benefit from conduct redounding to manufac-
turer's fiscal advantage).
291. Wangen, 294 N.W.2d at 453-54; 1 JAMES D. GH1ARDI & JoHN J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.10 (1988). But see Republic Ins. Co. v. Hires, 810 P.2d 790,
796 n.5 (Nev. 1991) (Springer, J., concurring) (arguing small shareholders have little power over
corporate officers and directors).
292. An in-depth analysis of all the constitutional issues raised by this proposal is beyond the
scope of this Article. This section, in the notes and the text, simply attempts to raise, and briefly
address, some of those issues.
293. Adding money damages to the jury's award is an impermissible additur which violates
the Seventh Amendment. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-87 (1935). On the other hand, it
could be argued that payment of the cost of notification is no different from other situations in
which a judge may impose additional costs on the losing party (e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b) (1995)
which provides for attorneys fees in civil rights cases), and thus payment of the costs of notifica-
tion has no Seventh Amendment implications.
294. An unresolved question is whether, if the notification sanction has financial implications
beyond the monetary award itself, the imposition of this sanction violates the Seventh Amend-
ment right to a jury trial by imposing a sanction not considered by the jury. One potential
solution to this problem is that juries be instructed on the fact that if they award punitive dam-
ages, the award and their reasons for the award will be publicized. In fact, legislatures enacting
this proposal may want to allow defendants subject to the sanction to present evidence of the
potential financial impact of the negative publicity attendant with the publication of the award.
The more juries are informed about the publicity sanction and its potential impact, the more
connected they are to the resulting sanction. Direct jury involvement in the sanction weakens, if
not eliminates, the argument that imposition of the publicity penalty violates a defendant's right
to a jury trial. Instructing the jury and allowing the defendant to present evidence about the
potential impact of the notification sanction also goes a long way towards addressing a defend-
ant's concern that its due process right of "notice and opportunity to be heard" is not violated.
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For guidance on how to pay the costs of notification, one could look
to the split award statutes some states have enacted. 295 While preserv-
ing the financial inducement necessary to encourage plaintiffs to
spend the time and money required to prosecute punitive damages
claims,2 96 the split award statutes also require that a portion of the
award be paid to the state.2 97 The same idea may be utilized in imple-
menting the publicity penalty. A portion of the jury's award may be
used to publicize the defendant's misconduct, thus eliminating the
concern that the proposal directly increases the amount of the jury's
award.298
An analogous issue is whether a legislature, in assessing a non-monetary penalty which can
have serious financial repercussions, interferes with the jury's function to determine the true
amount of damages, thus violating the doctrine of separation of powers. One response to this
concern can be found in opinions addressing this issue in the context of legislation limiting com-
pensatory damage awards. Some courts have noted that since the legislature has the power to
modify, or even eliminate, existing common law claims, it also has the power to determine reme-
dies. Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1331-32 (D. Md. 1989); Etheridge v.
Medical Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525, 532 (Va. 1989). This determination of remedies does not
violate the separation of powers doctrine. Franklin, 704 F. Supp. at 1331; Etheridge, 376 N.E.2d
at 531-32. In the context of this proposal, rather than limiting an existing remedy, a legislature
would be creating a new one. However, the arguments regarding a legislature's power to do so
are, in many ways, the same arguments used to uphold the constitutionality of limits on punitive
and compensatory damage awards. For a discussion of those arguments, see Edmonds v. Mur-
phy, 573 A.2d 853, 861 (Md. 1990); Hallahan, supra note 72, at 434-46.
295. Numerous states have enacted statutes requiring that a portion of punitive damages be
paid to the state, while preserving an attorney's right to collect his or her fee. See Shores, supra
note 260, at 88-89 (discussing six state statutes which allocate punitive damages awards); Sloane,
supra note 260, at 477-78 (noting that as of 1993, nine states had enacted "split award" statutes).
296. Most split award statutes recognize the need for financial incentives to bring the claims
and only allocate a percentage of the award to public coffers. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
21-102 (Supp. 1995) (requiring that one-third be paid to the state general fund); FLA. STAT. ANNr'.
§ 768.73(2)-(4) (West Supp. 1995) (earmarking 35% of the award to the state); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-12-5. (e)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1994) (awarding 75% to the state); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e)
(1994) (mandating 50% payable to the state treasurer); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(c) (1993) (allo-
cating 50% to the state).
If a split award statute exists, the notification costs should be paid for from the state's portion
of the award. Because the purpose of the notification sanction is the same as that which justifies
paying a portion of the award into a public fund, it is not inconsistent with the intent of a split
award statute to require payment of notification costs from the state's portion of the recovery.
297. Like the split award statutes, an issue raised by this proposal is whether requiring that a
portion of the award be used to pay for notification constitutes an unconstitutional "taking"
under the Fifth Amendment. For cases dealing with this issue in the split award statute context,
see Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 270 (Colo. 1991) (finding taking). Cf. Gordon
v. State, 585 So. 2d 1033, 1035-36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd 608 So. 2d 800, 801-02 (Fla.
1992) (finding no taking); Shepherd Components v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assoc., 473
N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991) (finding no taking); see also E. Jeffrey Grube, Note, Punitive Dam-
ages: A Misplaced Remedy, 66 S. CAL- L. REV. 839, 871-75 (1993) (discussing substantive due
process and takings); Sloane, supra note 260, at 495-99 (analyzing Kirk and Gordon).
298. See supra note 294 and accompanying text (discussing the Constitutional implications of
the indirect financial burden this proposal may cause).
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Another constitutional issue arising with the proposed publicity
penalty is that it may infringe on a defendant's First Amendment
rights. The First Amendment prohibits the government from forcing a
speaker to endorse a particular view.299 Sometimes, even the appear-
ance of endorsement violates the First Amendment. For example, in
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Califor-
nia,300 the United States Supreme Court held that a Utility Commis-
sion could not force a public utility to include in its mailed bills a
newsletter from a ratepayer's group even if the newsletter had a
disclaimer.30
A defendant may argue that if it must handle the logistics of the
publication, it is being asked to endorse the jury's verdict and the noti-
fication thereof.302 To avoid First Amendment problems altogether,
the notice could be publicized by the administrative office of the
court.
303
299. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977). See United States v. Clark. 918 F.2d 843, 848 (9th Cir. 1990)
(discussing First Amendment issues arising when a public apology is imposed as a condition of
probation); Goldschmitt v. Florida, 490 So. 2d 123, 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
sanction of affixing "Convicted D.U.I.-Restricted License" bumper sticker on car did not vio-
late the defendant's First Amendment rights); Cowan, supra note 106, at 2408-09 (discussing
First Amendment issues in the context of the Corporate Criminal Sentencing Guidelines); Jaimy
M. Levine, Comment, "Join The Sierra Club!": Imposition of Ideology as a Condition of Proba-
tion, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1845-48 (1994) (discussing the First Amendment implications of
notification).
300. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
301. Id.
302. Id. at 15-16 n.12. One could argue that this publication requirement is akin to a publica-
tion requirement of legal notices, which does not violate the First Amendment. However, given
the content of the notification, it is much more "ideological" than traditional legal notices. An-
other argument is that because the proposed notification sanction provides consumers with fac-
tual information regarding a corporation's unsafe products or unethical business practices, "it
has more in common with truth-in-advertising laws and labelling requirements than with at-
tempts to impose ideological messages on unwilling carriers." Cowan, supra note 106, at 2409.
However, again, because of the content of this notice, that argument may fail.
303. However, management of the logistics of publication by the administrative office of the
courts raises another issue. That is, whether the imposition of the publicity penalty, especially if
mandatory and administered by the courts, has Double Jeopardy implications. See United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 441-42 (1989) (noting that if a state's actions are punitive, the Double
Jeopardy clause applies, even if the action is labelled a "civil" action).
A related issue, if the courts become involved in administering the penalty, will be whether
required publication violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual pun-
ishment," or whether the potential financial effects of publication implicate the Eighth Amend-
ment's "excessive fines" clause. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has held that the
Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause does not apply to punitive damages in cases between
private parties when the government has no share in the recovery. Browning-Ferris Indus. v.
Kelso Disposal Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259-60 (1989). It based its decision, in part, on the long ac-
cepted common law practice of awarding punitive damages and the history underlying the enact-
ment of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 268-76. Because the proposed notification sanction does
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CONCLUSION
Public notification adds an essential powerful punch to monetary
sanctions in two ways. First, companies cannot pass along to the con-
sumer the costs they suffer from public notification.304 Second, it
strikes a chord that motivates businesses to change unethical or im-
proper business practices-the threat posed by negative public reac-
tion to these practices. 305
Currently, no systematized method exists to inform the public about
the business' misconduct. This lack of information dissemination
means a business' image may remain untarnished despite its
wrongdoing.
In earlier times, word rapidly spread when a business' practice re-
sulted in problems for customers. A business owner in a small town
quickly became aware that the tide of public opinion was hurting his
business. If he wanted to continue doing business, he knew he would
have to discontinue the practice disapproved of by the community.30 6
The industrialization of society has not diminished businesses' con-
cerns about the damaging impact of dissemination of negative infor-
mation. Businesses still worry about the impact of negative publicity
on their images. 30 7 However, in today's society most consumers no
longer live in closely knit communities. Nor do they primarily fre-
quent small local businesses. Likewise, suppliers and others patroniz-
ing a business may be dealing with a multi-national corporation rather
not enjoy the same common law history as monetary punitive damage penalties, how the Court's
decision in Browning-Ferris relates to this proposal is unclear. Additionally, in Browning-Ferris,
the Court left undecided the issues whether the excessive fines clause applies to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment or if the Eighth Amendment protects corporations as well
as individuals. Id. at 276. If this proposal becomes part of the public debate on an effective
means to punish and deter corporate misconduct, these issues should be explored in greater
depth.
Finally, in addition to the constitutional issues discussed above and those discussed earlier in
this section (see supra notes 293-96 and accompanying text), legislation enacting this proposal
will have to be drafted in such a way that the penalty does not violate the defendant's procedural
or substantive due process rights. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct.
2711, 2718-24 (1993) (discussing substantive and procedural due process issues in punitive dam-
ages claims), Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18-24 (1991) (discussing substan-
tive and procedural due process issues in punitive damages claims). As a starting point in
addressing due process issues, as suggested above, legislatures should require that juries be in-
structed about the mandatory imposition of the sanction, and defendants should be allowed to
present evidence on the sanction's potential impact.
304. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing companies' ability to pass the cost
of punitive damages awards on to consumers).
305. See generally FissE & BRAITHWArITE, supra note 1; Rustad, supra note 7, at 76.
306. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 888 (W. Va. 1992).
307. See supra notes 172-86 and accompanying text (discussing businesses' concern about
their image).
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than a local concern. Because of these societal changes, a business'
egregious misconduct is less likely to be known by those with whom
the business deals. Without information about the misconduct, the
public has neither the ability, nor the perceived need, to influence a
change in the business' practice.
Public notification would use today's technology to return to yester-
day's means of eliminating misconduct. Outstripping traditional me-
dia, such as television, radio and the press, the "information
superhighway" makes us more like a "global village" 308 today than at
any time in the past.30 9 Publication of a business' misconduct on a
single page on the World Wide Web would mean that millions quickly
would be able to learn of the misconduct.
In today's world, individuals as well as businesses deal with national
and international corporations. Broadly publicized notification is es-
sential to inform the public about a business' wrongdoing. The pro-
posed publicity penalty could achieve widespread dissemination of the
facts surrounding a business' misconduct. Armed with information
about why a business is liable for punitive damages, a knowledgeable
public may individually, and ultimately collectively, express disap-
proval of the misconduct. The business' sensitivity to this disapproval
would provide a powerful incentive for change.
The advent of the Internet and other technology which rapidly
spreads information across the globe present us with an opportunity
to reevaluate punitive damages and fashion sanctions that serve all
parties and society. This article attempts to open the debate about
alternative means to accomplish the goals of punitive damages.
308. For example, in the Sunday New York Times business section, a full page ad announced:
"Hi there! We're your new neighbor. HIROSHIMA Now on Internet." The ad went on to
explain that various enterprises in Hiroshima, Japan joined the Internet community because they
"thought it would be the best way to get out and really communicate with the rest of the world
...." The ad then listed e-mail addresses for various local government agencies, universities and
regional companies in Hiroshima. N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 1, 1995, at F3.
309. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (providing statistics on the number of Internet
users). The Internet crosses state and national boundaries. The number of people and busi-
nesses using this means of communication continues to grow rapidly. However, as stated earlier,
because access to the Internet is less available to the economically disadvantaged (see Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 8), the existence of the Internet does not eliminate the need to publicize the
information in traditional media forums.
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